Transaction Analysis: Indians trade Corey Kluber

Traded RHP Corey Kluber to the Texas Rangers for RHP Emmanuel Clase and OF Delino DeShields

Designated IF Mike Freeman for Assignment

It is difficult to be objective about a trade involving Corey Kluber, regardless of the return. He’s one of the 10 best pitchers in franchise history, certainly the best since Sam McDowell (who last pitched for the Indians in 1971). He won 2 AL Cy Young Awards, and nearly pitched the Indians to a championship in 2016. His rise from obscurity in 2013 heralded the beginning of a seven-year run of competitiveness, including four playoff appearances.

2019 was a lost season for Kluber. He had started out poorly, which has happened in the past, but unlike previous years, he didn’t have a chance to warm up with the weather. On May 1st, a line drive caught him on his pitching arm, fracturing his ulna. He would make some rehab starts in late August, but an oblique strain ended any hope of him pitching the rest of the season.

The Indians would pick up his $17.5M option after the season, and it appeared that they would either try to trade him this winter or bank on him returning to form in 2020. The Indians had depth in the rotation, so it made sense to try to use that depth to improve other areas of the club.

When Gerrit Cole and Stephen Strasburg signed record-breaking contracts, both in terms of AAV (Average Annual Value) and length, I assumed that if anything the Indians would be in a position of strength. Kluber’s $18.5M salary (with a projected 3.4 fWAR) seemed downright reasonable compared to any of the starters left on the market, even considering his injury-marred 2019 campaign.

So when the news hit that Kluber was being traded to the Texas Rangers, my first thought was that the Indians had in fact extracted a great return. After all, Kluber had been mentioned in connection with several other teams in recent days (Dodgers and Angels, just to name the two most prominent), and I figured that the Indians had played all the contenders against each other. If the deal was anything like the Trevor Bauer trade last July, the Indians would be getting at least a couple “win-now” players plus several good prospects.

Then Ken Rosenthal tweeted this:

I thought: “huh, I guess the return is going to be mostly prospects.” Especially considering this next tweet:

But then even those hopes were dashed:

The trade ended up being RHP Emmanuel Clase and OF Delino DeShields for RHP Corey Kluber and $500,000. And of course the roughly $15M the Indians saved. Underwhelming, to say the least.

Now don’t get me wrong: both players the Indians received will help the team in 2020. Clase, who made his MLB debut this past season, is a much-needed power bullpen arm, and has the stuff to close games. Delino DeShields is a better fourth outfielder/pinch-runner than the Indians had on the roster. But neither of these players are what I’d term core players. Perhaps Clase could be the next Cody Allen if everything works out, but he’s way too young and inexperienced to know what he is right now. If you want to look at it from a purely WAR perspective, the Indians gave up 3.4 fWAR and got 1.1 fWAR back in return, plus $15M, and that’s assuming that the money will be spent.

With teams promising the moon and the stars to any half-way decent starting pitcher on the free agent market (as I write this, Madison Bumgarner just got 5/$85M from Arizona), to get this anemic a return is a major disappointment. Knowing what we know now, it’s obvious that the Indians picked up Kluber’s option merely in order to trade him this winter, and other teams called their bluff.

And this is not taking into account how the overall fanbase is going to take this trade. Corey Kluber was one of the faces of the franchise, and trading him for a fourth outfielder and an interesting but unproven bullpen arm is not going to sit well, especially after the events of last winter. So I certainly hope that the Indians already have a major move, or series of moves teed up to go. I don’t think anyone is expecting them to trade for Mookie Betts, but signing Marcell Ozuna or trading for Starling Marte would make this trade defensible. Oh yeah, it would also help to announce that Francisco Lindor is no longer available on the trade market.

Because the Indians acquired two players on the 40-man roster, they needed to clear a spot, so they designated Mike Freeman for assignment. I think the Indians will be signing a free agent second baseman, which meant that Freeman’s days on the 40-man were numbered, though I thought he might stick around through Spring Training.

Here’s what the roster looks like after the moves today:

Link to live file (OneDrive)

I penciled Adam Plutko in as the fifth starter because he’s out of options, but realistically you could have a number of other pitchers beat him out this spring (Plesac, Rodriguez, even Moss or Allen). The Indians still need at least one corner outfielder and either a second or third baseman, and theoretically now have anywhere from $25-30M to play with. Let’s hope they actually use it.

On the reported Lindor trade talks

This was originally a comment on Let’s Go Tribe a week or so ago, but I think it’s worth re-purposing today given this tweet/article:

My rule of thumb: if a rumor is not sourced to a specific quote or piece of reporting, it’s just made up garbage and should be treated with contempt and ignored. It also depends on the “hit rate” of the reporter, too. For example, if Ken Rosenthal reports that the Indians are looking to trade X player, you generally take it more seriously than if Jon Paul Morosi or Bob Nightengale reports it. You also need to understand who the source is so that you can understand the motivation for leaking the information. If the source is “front office of a rival team” or something like that, it’s probably chaff thrown out into the media to help negotiations with either the Indians or another team. Also remember that teams talk to each other all the time, and probably every single player on the roster will get mentioned, even if the team would never trade that player.

With that in mind, let’s turn to Nightengale’s article. This is the important bit:

Hoping to make a big splash as their World Series drought continues, the Los Angeles Dodgers are discussing a trade for shortstop Francisco Lindor with the Cleveland Indians, according to a person with direct knowledge of the talks.

The person spoke to USA TODAY Sports on the condition of anonymity because talks are ongoing.

Let’s think about what’s being said, or what’s not being said. That the Indians were going to explore a trade for Lindor is not exactly news, even if you hadn’t been plugged into your Twitter feed for the past couple of days. It’s an open secret that the Indians aren’t going to keep Lindor past the 2021 season, with acknowledgment from both Lindor and the Indians. The talented shortstop is going to command a contract along the lines of what Manny Machado (10/$300M) and Bryce Harper (13/$330M) received last winter, and the Indians aren’t going to match the length of contract that Lindor will command (at least 8 years), especially at the AAV (average annual value) of at least $35M.

But, for now, all Nightengale is reporting is that the teams are discussing a trade. Not “close to consummating” or anything along those lines. Chris Antonetti, Cleveland’s president of baseball operations, alluded to these “trade talks” yesterday:

“There’s nothing we need to do with any player,” Antonetti said. “Frankie has established himself as one of the best players in baseball and we’re fortunate to have him. Because he’s such a good player, a lot of teams call with interest.”

With the Dodgers losing out on Gerritt Cole yesterday, they are logically moving on to trade targets, with Lindor obviously at the top of the list. And from the Indians’ standpoint, the Dodgers have a lot of players that would be great fits, starting with top prospect Gavin Lux, who just so happens to be a middle infielder. If there’s any team that could entice the Indians to deal Lindor this winter, it’s the Dodgers.

As for who the source is, I lean towards it being a member of the Dodgers front office to let somebody else (another team? an agent?) know that they have another option. I don’t think there’s anything to gain from the Indians’ standpoint for this information to get out to the public. If the Cleveland front office wanted to use a leak to their negotiating advantage, they would have mentioned that the Indians were talking with several teams, not just the Dodgers.

In summary, I don’t think it’s quite time to panic or get excited yet, depending on your view. Now if Ken Rosenthal or Buster Olney starts tweeting about a deal being imminent, then it’s time to go nuts.

Offseason Journal: Prelude to the Winter Meetings

Teams have already made some major moves, but as yet the Indians haven’t been one of them. The only move made in the run-up to the Winter Meetings that will affect the Opening Day roster was the Non-Tender Day swap of backup catchers.

Link to live file (OneDrive)

Let’s back up a bit and take the various sets of roster moves one by one.

Rule 5 Roster Day (November 20th)

This was the final day that clubs could protect minor-league players from the Rule 5 Draft by adding them to the 40-man roster. The Indians came into the day with two open spots (38) and wanted to protect three players, so they needed to drop one.

Designated RHP Nick Goody for Assignment

Goody was fantastic in 2017, but missed a large portion of 2018 and wasn’t quite the same this past season. He did land on his feet, though, as the Texas Rangers claimed him off waivers 6 days later.

Purchased the contracts of LHP Scott Moss and OF Daniel Johnson from Columbus (AAA)

Purchased the contract of Triston McKenzie from Lynchburg (A+)

Johnson was acquired from Washington last winter (Yan Gomes), while Moss was one of the players received in the three-team Trevor Bauer trade last July. Both players will at some point contribute to the club next year, and Johnson has a decent shot at making the Opening Day roster, depending on what the Indians do this winter.

McKenzie, who at one time was among the best prospects in the system, has slipped in recent years due to injury and struggles on the field, but still has the upside to be in a major-league rotation. And given how starting pitching is valued, there’s no way the Indians could have gotten away with leaving him unprotected. If everything breaks right he would be in the mix for a late-season call up, but it’s more likely that he contributes in 2021 (or would be traded).

Traded 2B Mark Mathias (AAA) to the Milwaukee Brewers for C Andres Melendez

Mathias was eligible, and the Indians were not going to protect him, so the Brewers, rather than wait to select him in the Rule 5 Draft and deal with the restrictions that comes with it, traded for him and added him to their 40-man roster. That means the Brewers can option him to the minors. If they had selected him in the Rule 5 Draft, they would have had to keep him on their active roster (or Injured List) all season.

Non-Tender Day (December 2)

This is the day by which clubs must offer any player on their 40-man roster not already signed to a contract a contract tender. If they don’t tender a contract, the player immediately becomes a free agent and can sign with any team. Usually players that are non-tendered are in the last few years of arbitration (service times of 4-5 years), with their projected salaries not matching their projected production. The Indians had already released most of the players they were going to non-tender (Danny Salazar, for example), so expectations going into this day was that they would be quiet.

However, that didn’t happen.

Traded RHP Adenys Bautista (R-) to the Boston Red Sox for C Sandy Leon

Designated RHP James Hoyt for Assignment

Leon is a catcher that has a good reputations on defense and with pitching staffs, but has done almost nothing on offense since 2016. He has 5+ years of service time, and was projected to make $2.8M in arbitration (according to MLB Trade Rumors). Meanwhile the Indians’ backup catcher, Kevin Plawecki, was projected to make around $1.4M. The Indians obviously liked Leon’s skill set better than Plawecki’s but not $1.4M better, as we’ll see shortly. Bautista is not much of a prospect, a

Hoyt was not arbitration-eligible, but was designated just because he was #40 on the Tribe’s value board. He would be re-signed a couple days later, though.

Signed 2020 contract with C Sandy Leon ($2M), avoiding arbitration

That made the difference between Leon and Plawecki $500-600k.

Non-tendered RHP James Hoyt and C Kevin Plawecki

Hoyt had been designated for assignment earlier in the day, and this made him a free agent before he passed through waivers. It’s obvious in retrospect that the Indians and Hoyt had already talked, as he’d be re-signed to a major-league contract. As for Plawecki, the writing for him was on the wall when the Indians acquired Leon. He was out options, and the Indians weren’t going to be carrying three catchers on the active roster, even with a 26th spot available this year.

Signed free agent RHP James Hoyt to a major-league contract

Thus bringing the 40-man roster back up to 40. If the Indians want to make a selection in Thursday’s Rule 5 Draft, they’ll need to clear a spot, but I don’t see that happening, especially they will eventually need to clear at least a couple spots for acquisitions (2B/3B and OF).

A summary of the Houston Astros sign-stealing scandal

On November 12th, The Athletic’s Ken Rosenthal and Evan Drellich released a bombshell piece of reporting (paywall): proof that Houston Astros, during 2017 home games, were stealing signs in real time and relaying them to the batter. Members of the team set up a monitor in the dugout tunnel that displayed a feed from center field in real time, and once they had deciphered the catcher’s signals, banged on a trash can to indicate an off-speed pitch; if a fastball was called, there was no banging. Because the banging was audible on TV broadcasts, and the article mentioned a particular incident, the allegation was easy to confirm by anyone with access to Youtube. In fact, just a couple of hours after the article appeared, Jomboy, a Internet baseball commentator, posted this fantastic breakdown on Twitter:

Before long numerous other examples were found throughout the season, and the pattern (bang for an off-speed pitch, no bang for a fastball) remained consistent throughout all the other incidents. Keep in mind also that the Astros won the 2017 World Series.

Before exploring the immediate fallout from this revelation, let’s take a step back in order to understand why these allegations are so damaging to the Astros in particular and MLB in general.

Sign Stealing: legal versus illegal

From the time signals began to be used in baseball, the other team has tried to decipher them, whether they were from the third base coach (for the batter) or the catcher (for the pitcher). The benefit of knowing for certain the type of pitch that is coming is immense for a major-league hitter. There are very few pitchers with the type of stuff that will miss bats if the batter knows the pitch ahead of time.

With that being said, it is not illegal in MLB for teams to use on-field personnel to decipher signs; for example, if a runner on second who has deciphered the pitch signs signals them to the batter and is discovered, he will not be thrown out by the umpire or even fined by the league. However, if the signals were deciphered by non-human methods or were relayed from someone who isn’t on-field personnel (a player or coach), that is illegal sign stealing. The use of a mechanical device to steal signs has been banned since 1961, and “electronic methods” were specifically banned in 2001.

The Arms Race

As video technology (particularly resolution) has gotten better, it has become much easier to see the catcher’s signs from the traditional center field feed. And so, in recent years teams have become more paranoid about having their signs being stolen, even when there’s no runners on base, or other analysis being done in real-time (such as looking at tiny differences in a pitcher’s glove between pitches to see if there’s any “tells”).

In 2014, MLB instituted the current form of instant replay, in which a manager has the ability to challenge certain calls on the field and have them reviewed by the MLB office. As part of the new process, teams now employ replay assistants whose job it is to phone the manager if he or she thinks the play is worth reviewing. The assistant is provided with real-time video feeds to make the determination to review.

“Ok,” you may be saying, “how the heck does instant replay relate to stealing signs?” The reason is that the first proven instance of electronic sign stealing came because of that replay assistant. In 2017, the New York Yankees filed a complaint against the Boston Red Sox alleging that their replay assistant was texting the pitch calls to an athletic trainer in the dugout, who would relay the calls to the batter. After reviewing the complaint, which was later publicized by the New York Times, MLB commissioner Rob Manfred issued his findings and punishment:

  September 15, 2017 (edit: remember this date!)

Baseball Commissioner Robert D. Manfred, Jr. issued the following statement today: 

"Several weeks ago, the New York Yankees filed a complaint with the Commissioner's Office alleging that the Boston Red Sox violated certain Major League Baseball Regulations by using electronic equipment to aid in the deciphering of signs being given by the Yankees' catcher. The Commissioner's Office has conducted a thorough investigation of the allegation. Today, I am prepared to disclose the results of that investigation.

"At the outset, it is important to understand that the attempt to decode signs being used by an opposing catcher is not a violation of any Major League Baseball Rule or Regulation. Major League Baseball Regulations do, however, prohibit the use of electronic equipment during games and state that no such equipment 'may be used for the purpose of stealing signs or conveying information designed to give a Club an advantage.' Despite this clear Regulation, the prevalence of technology, especially the technology used in the replay process, has made it increasingly difficult to monitor appropriate and inappropriate uses of electronic equipment. Based on the investigation by my office, I have nonetheless concluded that during the 2017 season the Boston Red Sox violated the Regulation quoted above by sending electronic communications from their video replay room to an athletic trainer in the dugout. 


"Taking all of these factors as well as past precedent into account, I have decided to fine the Red Sox an undisclosed amount which in turn will be donated by my office to hurricane relief efforts in Florida. Moreover, all 30 Clubs have been notified that future violations of this type will be subject to more serious sanctions, including the possible loss of draft picks.


The punishment meted out to the Red Sox, an undisclosed fine, was in my opinion much too lenient for the severity of the violation. Knowing what pitch is coming is a massive advantage, particularly in a close game. Manfred, did, however, issue a warning that further violations would be met with more severe penalties.

Please note that Manfred’s statement was issued on September 15, 2017. The incident covered by Jomboy above happened a week later on September 22. So the Astros were violating the rule even after Manfred issued his warning.

Fast forward to the 2018 postseason. The Cleveland Indians were swept by the Astros in the ALDS, but after the series, Jeff Passan of Yahoo! Sports broke this story:

 HOUSTON – The Boston Red Sox were warned that a man credentialed by the Houston Astros might try to steal signs or information from their dugout after the Cleveland Indians caught him taking pictures of their dugout with a cellphone camera during Game 3 of the American League Division Series, sources with knowledge of the situation told Yahoo Sports.

A photograph obtained by Yahoo Sports showed a man named Kyle McLaughlin aiming a cell phone into Cleveland’s dugout during the Indians’ 11-3 loss that ended their season. McLaughlin was the same man caught taking pictures near the Red Sox’s dugout during Game 1 of the AL Championship Series, which was first reported by the Metro Times. McLaughlin was removed by security in Cleveland and Boston, sources said. 

Click through to the article to view the photograph. This incident again prompted an investigation by MLB, and once again there were no real consequences:

  "Before the postseason began, a number of Clubs called the Commissioner's Office about sign stealing and the inappropriate use of video equipment. The concerns expressed related to a number of Clubs, not any one specific Club. In response to these calls, the Commissioner's Office reinforced the existing rules with all playoff Clubs and undertook proactive measures, including instituting a new prohibition on the use of certain in-stadium cameras, increasing the presence of operations and security personnel from Major League Baseball at all Postseason games and instituting a program of monitoring Club video rooms.

"With respect to both incidents regarding a Houston Astros employee, security identified an issue, addressed it and turned the matter over to the Department of Investigations. A thorough investigation concluded that an Astros employee was monitoring the field to ensure that the opposing Club was not violating any rules. All Clubs remaining in the playoffs have been notified to refrain from these types of efforts and to direct complaints about any in-stadium rules violations to MLB staff for investigation and resolution. We consider the matter closed." 

The justification of “we were just seeing of the other guy was cheating” seems laughable on its face, but the commissioner somehow bought it. At least in the immediate aftermath, while the postseason was still ongoing.

After the season, MLB instituted several new rules regarding electronic devices. They included:

  • Banning all non-broadcast cameras from foul pole to foul pole
  • The only live game feed will be provided to the team’s replay booth, and a trained MLB employee will ensure there is no illegal communication between the replay booth and the dugout or field of play. All other game feeds will occur on an eight-second delay
  • No television monitors will be allowed between the clubhouse and the dugout.

In retrospect, these rules were designed to stop exactly the type of scheme the Astros were using in 2017. Houston installed a camera in center field (bullet point one), had installed a TV monitor between the clubhouse and the field (point three) and were giving the batter the signs in real time (point two). So I think MLB had some inkling that this type of cheating was going on: they perhaps just didn’t have any evidence.

Until last week.

Crime and Punishment

That brings us up to the Athletic report. After the article dropped, the Houston Astros announced that were cooperating with MLB on an investigation into the allegations, and would make no other comment (which is an improvement on how they handled the Brandon Taubman incident):

 Regarding the story posted by The Athletic earlier today, the Houston Astros organization has begun an investigation in cooperation with Major League Baseball. It would not be appropriate to comment further on this matter at this time. 

This placed the ball back in Manfred’s court. He had let the Red Sox off with a fine in 2017, then did nothing regarding the Astros employee in the 2018 postseason. This time his rhetoric was different:

 "Any allegations that relate to a rule violation that could affect the outcome of a game or games is the most serious matter," Manfred said. "It relates to the integrity of the sport. In terms of where we are, we have a very active -- what is going to be a really, really thorough investigation ongoing. But beyond that, I can't tell you how close we are to done." 

He also said that the Astros were the only team MLB was currently looking at, but later said:

 “We are going to investigate the Astros situation as thoroughly as humanly possible,” Manfred said after the conclusion of the owners’ meetings. “That investigation is going to encompass not only what we know about ’17, but also ’18 and ’19. We are talking to people all over the industry. Former employees, competitors, whatever. To the extent that we find other leads, we’re going to follow these leads. We will get to the bottom of what we have out there in terms of what went on to the extent that it’s humanly possible. I just can’t speculate beyond that.” 

So although this investigation may start with the Astros, it may not end there, which is as it should be. Even if it turns out that the Astros had the most sophisticated method, any team that utilized electronics should be punished. It is critical that fans have faith that the game they are watching is being played within the rules, and that one team does not have an unfair advantage over the other.

That takes us to the topic of punishment. Twice now (in the 2017 Red Sox statement and the pre-season rules in 2019) teams have warned that violation of the sign stealing rules could result in the loss of draft picks or similar punishment. Craig Edwards of Fangraphs looked at Manfred’s history of punishments for organizational violations and came away with these broad criteria:

  • Is this the first time a team has been penalized for breaking the rules?
  • Was the organization cooperative with MLB’s investigation?
  • How high up the organizational chain does the knowledge and activity go?

As an example, he examines MLB’s investigations into international signing violations. In 2016, the Red Sox were punished for violating the signing rules by not being able to sign any international free agents for a year and by having those players that were signed illegally declared free agents. A year later, the Atlanta Braves broke those same rules, and not only were they punished with a greater loss of international signing caps, but Braves general manager John Coppollela was banned for life and another member of the front office was suspended for a year.

So if it is found that the Astros front office participated in, or at least knew about the illegal sign stealing, I would expect a similar type of punishment that the Braves received, with the team losing multiple draft picks, and suspensions of front office personnel, coaches, and players involved in the scheme. If there is evidence that the Astros used this scheme (or something similar to it) in the 2017/2018/2019 playoffs, the punishments would escalate even further.

One of Manfred’s roles as commissioner is to protect the institution, and that means he should come down hard on any individual or organization that places the existence of the sport in any kind of danger. This sign stealing scandal does in my opinion rise to that level.

Offseason Journal: The Arithmetic

As this off-season gets going in earnest, the Indians would seem to be in a better position than they were at this time last year. I used the word “seem” because I am assuming that the Indians will start the season with a payroll around $120-124M, the same range as last year.

Link to live file (OneDrive)

In addition to the cost-cutting moves (or non-moves in the case of Michael Brantley) made last winter, the Indians saved about $18M for the 2020 season by trading Trevor Bauer last July. They also saved another $19M net by declining the options of or releasing Jason Kipnis, Dan Otero, and Danny Salazar. By my calculations, the Indians should have $18M to spend between now and the end of July if their budget remains the same, and that’s with them picking up Corey Kluber’s $17.5M option.

In other words, the Indians aren’t going to be dangling Kluber or Francisco Lindor on the trade market because they need to cut payroll. I don’t think the Indians will end up trading either player for any reason, though: Lindor, because it’s going to be downright impossible to get a team to give them the type of value a player of Lindor’s caliber/contract demands, and Kluber because I don’t think teams will give up that much for a pitcher coming off an injury-marred season, even with his pedigree.

But the Indians do need to fill some holes, as the projected 2020 lineup indicates. With Naquin’s injury, I think they have to acquire at least one corner outfielder, perhaps even bringing back Yasiel Puig if the market doesn’t take an interest (MLB Trade Rumors projects him getting 1/$8M, which I think would be a bargain). As for the infield, I see the Indians grabbing a short-term solution at second or third (most likely second), with the idea that one of their crop of youngish infielders (Arroyo, Chang, Clement) would be ready to take over in 2021. They will also poke around for a reliever or two, though it would be out of character for them to pay market value.

The Indians could also fill one of the holes mentioned above by trading a starting pitcher. Adam Plutko is out of options and not likely to make the Opening Day starting rotation, so now might be the best time to see what you can get for him on a market that seems devoid of much starting pitching help. And maybe a team loses out on the big free agent prizes (Cole, Strasburg, Wheeler) and gets desperate enough to bowl the Indians with their offer for Corey Kluber.


The period following the end of the World Series is scripted such that all contract options and 40-man rosters are settled before the offseason moves can begin in earnest. This is done so that all teams are an equal footing as far as 40-man roster spots are concerned. For instance, when the season ended the Indians had 7 players on the 60-day Injured/Disabled List, therefore they had 47 players on the between the 40-man roster and the Injured Lists.

October 31, 2019 (day after the World Series)

Exercised the 2020 option of RHP Corey Kluber ($17.5M)

Declined the 2020 options of 2B Jason Kipnis ($16.5M/$2.5M) and RHP Dan Otero ($1.5M/$.1M)

( story)

3B Ryan Flaherty, RF Yasiel Puig, RHP Tyler Clippard, 2B Jason Kipnis, and RHP Dan Otero declared free agency

November 4, 2019

RHP Corey Kluber, OF Tyler Naquin, IF Christian Arroyo, RHP Danny Salazar, RHP Cody Anderson, LHP Tyler Olson, and RHP AJ Cole activated from the 60-day Injured List

RHP Danny Salazar, RHP Cody Anderson, LHP Tyler Olson, and RHP AJ Cole outrighted to AAA Columbus – all declared free agency

( story)

On Francisco Lindor, Success Cycles, and Rumor Laundering

Before diving in to the offseason, I want to re-expound on something that most people, especially on the national level, continue to not understand about how the Indians are making decisions.

The “success cycle” is the current paradigm for team building. At the start of the cycle, a team strips down their roster almost completely, trading off all their veteran players, and fielding a team that has no chance of winning for several years, with the side benefit of having an extremely low payroll. Then, assuming the front office made astute drafting and prospect evaluation decisions, the team begins to spend some money again, bringing in a couple key free agents. Then, when the young core is ready to compete for a championship, the wallet is opened wide and the minor-league system becomes only a vehicle for acquiring veteran players. Once the core gets old/expensive, the roster gets torn completely down and the cycle begins anew.

It is my belief that the Indians do not want to follow this cycle, having institutional memories about previous rebuilding eras. The 2002-2004 rebuild, short and necessary though it was, turned half the fanbase against the team, with attendance never recovering. The 2009-2012 rebuild wasn’t quite as devastating to attendance or fan perception, but nevertheless was not a fun period. In addition, the causes of those fallow periods haven’t been lost on the current front office, some of whom were there for them. Poor drafting, poor free agent decisions, and trading away prospects for short-term fixes were what sunk the team into the last two rebuilds, and many of the decisions since then have been made to avoid those previous mistakes.

With that in mind, consider the last year of decisions made by the Tribe front office. A typical team in the Indians’ place would have gorged itself in the free agent market, or at least traded some prospects to fill a hole. The Indians did neither, in fact they let go Michael Brantley via free agency, and suffered for it the following season. They traded Yan Gomes, their starting catcher, and shed payroll in several other moves. Yet they didn’t tear the roster apart, keeping the starting rotation together (at least to start the season) and the rest of the starting lineup. In other words, they didn’t commit to one path or the other that the success cycle demands of a team once the roster reached maturity. They did trade Trevor Bauer, but in return received a short-term rental (Yasiel Puig) and a medium-term solution (Franmil Reyes) in addition to some prospects.

So when the rumors about the Dodgers looking to trade for Francisco Lindor broke, I shook my head. The reporting by Jon Paul Morosi, as usual, is vague enough to be correct even if nothing happens:

Sources say the Dodgers are expected to pursue a trade for Indians shortstop Francisco Lindor as one possible addition to an offense that managed only a .303 on-base percentage during this month’s National League Division Series loss to the Nationals.


The Indians have made no apparent progress on a long-term extension for Lindor, and many in the industry believe there is a good chance he will be dealt before next Opening Day.

Note that this reporting is that the Dodgers will be pursuing Lindor, not that the Indians are either looking to trade him or even listening. Just that some people in the industry (read: other front offices) think the Indians would deal him because they haven’t been able to make progress on a long-term deal. This of course led to this headline from Beyond the Boxscore, an SBN site (sigh):

This is clickbait. Oh sure, the headline/sub-headline is hedging its bets by using “it sure looks like” and “Lindor might be on the move” but ultimately it is using a rather typical Hot Stove League piece of reporting (X team is interested in X player) to give an excuse to wag the finger at the Indians for not ponying up to sign Lindor to a long-term deal:

While the Dodgers trying to make a move happen doesn’t mean that Cleveland will Lindorit’s clear that Cleveland’s ownership has little interest in extending Lindor or retaining him when he reaches free agency after the 2021 season. If Cleveland were to trade Lindor, it would be hard to view it as anything other than a purely cost-cutting move. We saw what their miserly approach following the 2018 season did to an assured division title, so such a move would be an admission that profits are more important than winning. 

Was it disappointing that the Indians let Michael Brantley go last year? Absolutely. But this analysis is ridiculously simplistic. The Indians have been a competitive team for seven straight years now, and are to the point in a typical success cycle where other teams in mid-tier and low-tier markets have thrown in the towel and tore the team completely down. The Royals were competitive for five seasons (2013-2017), then tore their roster completely apart. The Pirates also lasted five seasons (same time frame) before firing practically everyone and presumably starting over. But for all the Indians’ “miserly” ways, they still managed to field a team that until the last series of the season was in contention for a playoff spot. In other words, they have maintained the payroll of a contending team for longer than their peers, and at least will try to be competitive for an eighth year.

The author of the article is applying to the Indians a template that is not applicable. The Indians may eventually trade Lindor because it’s obvious that they aren’t going to give out an 8-year deal at $30M+ average annual value, but I do not think that they will trade him this winter, as Morosi is suggesting, nor would a Lindor trade be driven by cost-cutting for 2020. Lindor even at a projected $16M-18M salary is still a bargain for any team, including the Indians. The Indians want to compete again in 2020, and Lindor is inextricably linked to that goal. He will very likely be playing for someone else by the end of the 2021 season, and almost certainly will be by the start of the 2022 season, but that’s just how mid-market teams fare when it comes to superstars.

If team owner Paul Dolan had wanted to maximize profit, he would have done what the Houston Astros or Chicago Cubs or many other teams since then did: completely tank, a strategy that this author would undoubtedly condemn. In 2013, the Astros had a payroll of $35M despite residing in one of baseball’s largest markets, a payroll that the Indians hadn’t had since 2004. Cleveland ownership’s spending obviously isn’t going be confused with the late Mike Illitch of the Detroit Tigers anytime soon, but the Dolans have now presided over as long a competitive window as the Jacobs Field Era Indians of the mid-to-late 1990s, and are attempting to extend that window into 2020 and beyond. As an Indians fan, it has been a fun seven seasons, and although I’d love for the team to spend more, I can’t complain much about the results on the field.

The author then remarks that (1) MLB revenues are up and (2) references a Ringer article about how top prospects who are traded tend to underperform. Let’s take each argument separately.

That MLB revenues are up but payrolls have not increased at the same rate may be an issue for the MLBPA to key on in the upcoming Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiations (they expire after the 2021 season), but this is not relevant to the Indians re-signing Francisco Lindor. Free agency is a competition between MLB clubs, and the Indians are not going to fare well in this competition because they don’t have the revenue sources that other teams do, as alluded to in this sentence:

Forbes’ valuation of each baseball team put Cleveland as the sixth-least valuable team, but as a brand they’re still worth $1.1 billion.

Furthermore, a team’s valuation is not relevant to having more cash to throw around unless the team borrows against it. Or the owners sell the team, I guess, but that’s not helpful either for obvious reasons. Dolan did sell a piece of the club to John Sherman a couple of years ago, but Sherman is going to have to divest that by the time he officially takes over as owner of the Kansas City Royals.

The Indians may be able to deal with the short-term risk of allocating ~20% of their payroll ($30M AAV) to one player, but they simply can’t deal with the risk of allocating a significant portion of their payroll to one player 8-10 years from now, when Lindor would likely be on the downside of his career. Lindor will likely ask for that length of contract on the free agent market, and I don’t blame him for it, given that both Bryce Harper and Manny Machado got those types of deals last winter. Lindor bet on himself by not taking an earlier long-term extension (a la Jose Ramirez), and now he’s well within his rights to collect on that wager.

As for not trading Lindor because prospects don’t tend to work out, that’s not an argument that resonates with Indians fans. Of the high-profile players that the Indians have traded since Bartolo Colon in 2002, almost all those trades eventually worked out. And that’s not counting the many core players that the Indians got in what were considered minor trades (Shin-Soo Choo, Asdrubal Cabrera, Mike Clevinger, to name but a few). If the organization has been consistently good in one thing, it’s been getting good value when they do trade a core player.

In conclusion, I have no doubt that the Indians will eventually trade Francisco Lindor, but I don’t think it will be this winter, and that they will do so with a similar goal as they had in dealing Trevor Bauer: a return that balances the short-term (Puig) with the medium-term (Reyes) and a bit of the long-term (prospects).

Regular Season Journal: Looking back, looking forward

It’s been a while since I posted anything here. I’ve been content to post whatever opinions I had on the Indians at Let’s Go Tribe (what can I say? old habits die hard), but the events of the past couple of weeks have put me in a more reflective frame of mind, something that a series of comments on a LGT post can’t satisfy.

The losses both in terms of games and key players (Corey Kluber, Jose Ramirez, Tyler Naquin) have turned what was looking to be an exciting divisional race into a desperate attempt to salvage a Wild Card spot.

But this post is not going to be about pre-lamenting a September swoon that may not even happen. It’s going to reflect on this season as one of transition that has, by and large, been managed adroitly by the Tribe front office. Some of the roster issues that Chris Antonetti and Mike Chernoff faced were self-imposed because of previous moves, others were imposed by the market size and/or ownership’s decree. And if the Twins weren’t on pace to win 100 games, even with those limitations the Indians might still have muddled through to a division title, warts and all.

Last winter the Indians had a difficult path to tread. It seemed obvious from the early-offseason statements given by Chris Antonetti that the payroll was not going to go up (from $138M at the end of 2018), and likely to drop a bit, though not as much as I anticipated (as things stand today, team payroll is $122M). There were several high-salaried players leaving via free agency (Michael Brantley, Andrew Miller, Cody Allen), but large salary increases to arbitration-eligible players like Francisco Lindor and Trevor Bauer would eat up those savings. That would be fine had the roster that remained been solid enough as is, but there were many holes that needed to be filled, particularly in the outfield. In other words, the Indians could make do losing Andrew Miller and Cody Allen (the acquisition of Brad Hand was made to mitigate this loss, and in retrospect it was a more prescient trade now than even last winter), but they didn’t have a player (or even multiple players) in the organization to replace Brantley, at least in the near term.

It is difficult to stay competitive for long periods of time and maintain a payroll that maxes out in the #13-15 range. The way the CBA is structured, good players get close to market value starting with their 5th year of MLB service time, and will get their most lucrative contract in their 7th or 8th year of service time. That means a team like the Indians have a small window to compete with one particular core group of players, and to remain competitive have to be continually develop the next core, as signing core free agents is not really an option. In theory, a successful mid-market organization would have a new core player waiting in the wings to replace every core player who leaves via free agency.

But this past winter, the Indians didn’t have anyone to replace Michael Brantley or even Lonnie Chisenhall. They had spent several first-round picks on outfielders 4-6 years ago (Tyler Naquin, Clint Frazier, Bradley Zimmer), but for various reasons none of those players could be penciled in the Opening Day lineup. Recognizing this, the Indians made a series of minor trades for outfielders that would either be temporary fixes (Leonys Martin), complementary players (Jordan Luplow) or even potential long-term solutions (Oscar Mercado). These trades weren’t prohibitively expensive in terms of prospects (though Willi Castro, who the Indians traded for Martin, has already made the majors and has some promise), but they weren’t trades the Indians should have had to make if their minor-league system was churning out a core player a year. And it still didn’t fix their immediate problem, which was outfield production in 2019. (Naquin would eventually become a viable corner outfielder, but it took a while, and now he’s out with a serious knee injury.)

Given all this, one potential solution to both the payroll problem and the outfield problem was to trade one of their good but expensive starting pitchers for at least one core outfielder. That obviously was not a move a team bent on competing would want to make, but seemed the lesser of evils. Based on reports throughout the off season, the Indians were talking to teams about trading Corey Kluber or Trevor Bauer, but never seemed to get the return they were looking for. They did, however, make a series of trades to cut payroll elsewhere. They somehow got the White Sox to take on Yonder Alonso’s 2019 salary, and saved more money in the Edwin Encarancion-Yandy Diaz for Carlos Santana-Jake Bauers swap. And they dealt Yan Gomes to Washington. Those deals seemed to get them to the targeted payroll level, and so they kept both Kluber and Bauer for 2019.

Of those three cost-cutting moves, the one I was vehemently against was the trade of Yan Gomes to the Washington Nationals. I didn’t like the return, and thought it would severely weaken the major-league roster. As it turned out, Gomes would be outplayed by his understudy Roberto Perez, and the players the Indians received have not only helped this year (Jefry Rodriguez) but may also play key roles next year (Daniel Johnson). I think Perez has been wearing down at the plate of late because this is the first time he’s been a full-time catcher over an entire season, but he’s been much better than Gomes at the plate, not to mention his incalculable contributions to a young and inexperienced starting rotation that has at times carried this team.

Ultimately, though, it wasn’t necessarily the moves made during the winter that kept the Indians in contention until the end, but player development decisions made well before that. For although the Indians began the season with an established rotation that was rated as among the best in baseball, that rotation wouldn’t remain intact for long, and all those projected innings would have to be covered by untested youngsters. Corey Kluber, Carlos Carrasco, and Mike Clevinger would miss considerable portions of the season due to injury or illness, and Trevor Bauer would have an inconsistent campaign. Of the five pitchers who started the season in the rotation, only Shane Bieber would make all his scheduled starts, and this was his first full big-league season.

Zach Plesac (12th round, 2016), Aaron Civale (3rd round, 2016), and Adam Plutko (11th round, 2013) have combined for more starts than Kluber, Carrasco, and Clevinger, and the Indians have the 3rd-best starting pitching ERA in the American League. That’s the reason why Antonetti/Chernoff felt they could trade Trevor Bauer at the deadline for offense, something they were thinking of doing way back before the season began, the only difference being that back then you would have assumed Kluber/Carrasco/Clevinger would be their normal selves.

The Bauer trade encapsulated the dual priorities that the Tribe front-office has been trying to simultaneously fulfill since the end of last season. There was a financial motivation for making the trade, as Bauer was headed towards another big salary increase via arbitration in 2020, with free agency afterwards. There was also a competitive motivation for the deal, as the Indians were (and still are) in the thick of the playoff race, and needed to improve their lineup. The two major-league players that they acquired also represented a balance between the short-term and medium-term: Yasiel Puig will be a free agent after the season and will undoubtedly sign elsewhere, while Franmil Reyes is under team control until at least 2024. Two of the three minor-league players the Indians received (pitchers Scott Moss and Logan Allen) could help the team next year.

When you manage a mid-market team, there are always going to be difficult decisions to make because the financial rules are stacked against you, but because of the moves made over the past 12 months, this winter’s dilemmas will be mild in comparison with those already dealt with. The Indians will decline Jason Kipnis’ 2020 option, making him a free agent, and he’ll be replaced by someone in the organization. They will release Danny Salazar. They will very likely pick up Corey Kluber’s 2020 option even after the injury-plagued season, given that they’ve already dealt Trevor Bauer. They may try to lock up Mike Clevinger, and will try (with no possibility of success) to lock up Francisco Lindor. Tyler Naquin’s major knee injury means that they may look at bringing in a veteran on a one-year major-league contract. They will be active in acquiring relievers, but not via free agency. In other words, expect the same modus operandi this offseason as the last one, but with a bit less drama.

If you’d like me to address anything Tribe-related in more detail, leave a comment or shoot me a message via the contact link on the sidebar.

Regular Season Journal: looking beyond the easy narrative

As we are fast approaching Memorial Day, a convenient point at which to evaluate a baseball season, I thought I would pick today to offer my off-the cuff thoughts on how the Indians and Twins have played, given that that was how I framed my outlook this past winter. No baseball team is its own island, as they are only deemed a success or failure by comparison to its competition, as such the Tribe’s 2019 season will be judged will be its record compared to that of the Twins.

Today’s standings see the Twins leading the Indians by 5.5 games, having the second-largest lead in baseball (the Astros have a 8.5-game lead over the second-place Angels in the AL West). The Indians are 24-20, while the Twins are 30-15, trailing only the Astros among all MLB teams. The Indians have a +3 win differential, which intimates that they’ve performed worse than their record would indicate. The Twins have a +77 win differential, and their record accurately reflects their performance (see the “X-W/L” column below).

How does this mesh with projections saying the Indians would waltz to another AL Central title? The Twins pitching has greatly over-performed projections (which were rather dismal) and their offense has also over-performed projections (which were already positive). The Indians are still allowing fewer R/G than the Twins (3.77 compared to 4.02), but that was supposed to be the method the Indians would use to power past the Twins this year. Instead, run-prevention is almost a push, while the Twins are blowing the Indians away in terms of run scoring (5.73 versus 3.84). Should these trends continue another six weeks, the Indians are going to need to start setting their sights on the Wild Card rather than the Division, as unless they get extremely lucky (or the Twins unlucky) they aren’t going to keep pace with that run gap.

As for causes for this turn of events, I would caution against assigning the team’s payroll reduction as the presiding one. I admit it is an easy narrative to grasp, but as with many easy narratives, it falls apart once you look more closely at it. The Indians are not one Michael Brantley (worth 2.1 bWAR so far for the Astros) from catching the Twins in the standings, and that is because several of their existing stars, whether it be Jose Ramirez or Francisco Lindor (the former due to not hitting, the latter due mostly to injury) are also under-performing. The trade of Yandy Diaz for Jake Bauers, which was more of a challenge trade than anything else, has also hurt the offense* based on how the two have played thus far. Jason Kipnis is on pace to have the worst season of his career. Tyler Naquin, who the Indians keep giving opportunities to, has not provided them with the type of production expected from a mid-first round pick. Bradley Zimmer, another past first-round selection, still hasn’t played a rehab game. All these offensive failures have little to do with spending and much more to do with either coaching or front office evaluations.**

On the other side of the ledger, the Indians have maintained their excellent run prevention despite losing both Corey Kluber and Mike Clevinger for extended periods of time. The Tribe front office’s moves look much better on this front, as surprising performances from Jefry Rodriguez (who came in the Yan Gomes trade, a deal I unequivocally panned this winter) and Nick Wittgren (who was acquired from the Marlins), not to mention addition by subtraction in the bullpen by letting both Cody Allen and Andrew Miller walk. Spending $5.5M on Danny Salazar (who has yet to appear in even a minor-league game) while cutting costs elsewhere is really the only blemish that I can see on the offseason pitching moves so far.

*I still maintain that the trade may work out for the Indians in the long term (I like Bauers’ future), but it has hurt the Indians this year.

My goal here is not to act as an apologist for Cleveland ownership, who I think misjudged by trying to save $10-15M and justifying it by thinking they would win the division anyway. Instead, by also bringing up failures not related to spending I hope to paint a picture much closer to the true causes of this team’s shortcomings than by just fixating on spending alone. At the end of a season, a fan isn’t going to (or shouldn’t) care about what the payroll was at any point of the year, but instead whether the team made the playoffs or not.

Book Review: Today I Am Carey

Today I Am Carey (2019) – by Martin L. Shoemaker

Genre: Science Fiction – Hard (with slice-of-life elements)

320 Pages

Publisher Store PageAmazonKobo

Over the winter, I’ve gotten back into reading for pleasure, and specifically into genres that I hadn’t delved into since I was a teenager. Empire of Silence (see review here) was the first sci-fi/fantasy novel I read in many years, and since then I’ve picked up many more in quick succession. I don’t plan to write a review of every book I read, as that seems at odds with the whole reading for pleasure goal, but reviewing books that I particularly enjoyed would seem to strike a decent balance. With that said, here is a review of a book I thoroughly enjoyed…

Today I Am Carey is a story set in the near future. It concerns an android named Carey that is designed to assist terminally-ill patients who are suffering with dementia. It is able to comfort these patients because it contains two different neural networks that can work together: one that can empathize with the patient, and another that can emulate (as in physically become) friends and family, whether living or dead. In the first chapters of the story, Carey becomes whoever Mildred, who is in the late stages of Alzheimer’s, asks for, whether it be her son, daughter-in-law, grandchildren, or even her departed husband.

Normally a medical care android’s memory will be wiped after their patient dies, but Mildred’s family asks for Carey to stay on with them, a request that is granted because something is unique with it, and Carey’s designer wants to try to understand why. The story takes off from there.

If you’ve read any of Isaac Asimov’s robot short stories, particularly Bicentennial Man (and the Robin Williams movie based off of it), you may recognize a similar theme at the beginning of Today I Am Carey: a robot/android that seems to be becoming almost human and the ethical and legal implications of that. But Today I Am Carey takes the story in a different direction, and in my opinion takes Asimov’s ideas into an entirely new realm of storytelling.

In Asimov’s robot stories, his Three Laws of Robotics prominently figure in just about every story. In the case of Bicentennial Man, the main issue is at what point a robot becomes physically human enough so that the Three Laws do not apply. In Today I Am Carey, there are some plot points that deal with Carey’s legal status, but the main thread of the story is more about its mental and emotional development towards becoming more human and how that affects the human characters in Carey’s life.

Although there are many ideas about artificial intelligence that Shoemaker explores throughout the book, Today I Am Carey also delves deeply into the human characters surrounding the protagonist. After all, what better narrator to use in a character-driven story than an android that has an empathy neural network? Carey, because of his unique construction, can infer things from its interactions that a human being would never be able to infer. I think that first-person narrative elevates the story from your standard exploration of ideas to something that every reader, not just those who enjoy science fiction, would enjoy and relate to.

Shoemaker’s prose is deceptively straight-forward. I still don’t know how he did it, but he was able to make a story narrated by an artificial intelligence in a matter-of-fact manner deliver powerful emotional impacts, even when you have an inkling that those impacts are coming. The ending ties the events of the story together in a way that was both perfectly appropriate and in a way I never saw coming.

Offseason Journal: A Postcript/Preview

Up to this point, I have solely focused attention on what the Indians have been doing, but that leaves unaddressed what the other teams in the AL Central have been doing, particularly the Minnesota Twins, the one team that I think could dethrone the Indians. There’s still an obvious gap between the two teams, but there’s enough potential on the Minnesota roster that you could see the possibilities on them making large improvements if a couple major things go right for them.

With that in mind, I’ve put together projected Opening Day rosters for the Twins and Indians to compare them.

The Indians’ roster looks as it stands this morning, as well as a zoomed-in version of just the 25-man roster.

Click to embiggen/live version

There has been a lot of uncertainty with this roster. The outfield and bullpen have essentially had open tryouts, and injuries to both Francisco Lindor and Jason Kipnis means that neither of them will be in the lineup this Thursday in Minnesota. This comes after a winter that saw the Indians prioritize cutting payroll over improving the roster for reasons gone into previously. But even after all of this, the Indians still seem by a significant margin the best team in the AL Central. The projections I used (Steamer for position players, ZiPS for pitchers) are 49.5 wins above replacement, which is just one win shy of their actual totals from last year.

Here is what the Twins are projected to do using the same ZiPS/Steamer combination. Some of the minor roles have changed since I did this exercise, but not enough to change the totals significantly.

Even after all the subtracting this past offseason, and even with question marks all over the roster, the Indians still project to win 10 more games than the Twins, their closest competition. If the starting rotation stays healthy, and the Indians can cobble together a functional (as in above replacement) bullpen and corner outfield, they’re still in good shape to win the AL Central again.

Which is one reason why I think the Indians prioritized the medium-term over the short-term this offseason. The gap between themselves and the rest of the AL Central wasn’t the only factor, as I don’t see this front office ever going completely for broke (too many institutional memories of 2002-03) or thinking for a short while like a large-market organization, but it did make those difficult decisions easier.

The caveats that need to be made: projections are not foolproof, as they are forecasting human beings that can get hurt or better or worse in ways completely independent of their age or previous results. I can easily imagine situations in which the Indians and Twins win totals are reversed. Breakout seasons for Kyle Gibson and Jose Berrios could quickly halve that 10-win gap, for instance.

With that being said, it’s time to enjoy some baseball. Happy New Year!