2000s

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Update

Don’t worry; I’m still here. What I’ve been doing the last couple weeks won’t be initially noticeable to you, yet it should provide a much better surfing experience.

I’m in the process of including in EVERY players’ profile their 2003 stats. I’d like to eventually provide their complete career statistics, but last year’s stats will provide a nice baseline as to you when you peruse that player’s profile. Is he a top prospect, or is he just a minor-league coach-in-waiting? Their stats will help you make your own decision. Eventually, I’d like to provide some comments as well, but let’s not get ahead of ourselves.

Also, for prospects listed on either Baseball America’s or On Deck Baseball’s organizational prospect lists, I’ll include each ranking. For those unfamiliar with either, Baseball America is generally more favorable to baseball players with the traditional tool set (speed, throwing arm, power, average, and defense). On Deck Baseball uses a statistical analysis to make up their rankings. So between the two, you should get a good idea as to what kind of player he is; and if the player is high on both lists, he’s probably got a great future ahead of him.

Some upcoming events:

In late February, I’ll post my second annual (that sounds weird, doesn’t it?) Spring Training Preview. I’ll comment on each player on the 40-man roster, plus NRIs as well as prospects that have a chance to make the big club in Winter Haven. Last year’s preview can be viewed here. I even mention a little-known outfielder as having a chance to make the team as a fifth outfielder 😉

As the season progresses, I’ll continue my ongoing series on the Top 100 Indians of all time. As Opening Day Approaches, I’ll transfer the countdown to the Tribe History site, as otherwise it would be pretty confusing. I’ll let you know when that happens.

The Alex Rodriguez Trade

As most of you know by now, reigning AL MVP Alex Rodriguez is very close to being traded to the New York Yankees. In exchange, the Texas Rangers receive 2B Alphonso Soriano, a PTBNL, and a lot of financial felxibility. This is a far better deal for the Rangers than they would have received from the Red Sox (basically a salary swap of Rodriguez and Manny Ramirez), and they receive a fairly inexpensive (for now) offensive star in Soriano.

For the Yankees, Rodriguez is a step up (though by not as much as you might think) from Soriano, and it makes their lineup on paper absolutely devastating. What does not make sense for the Yankees is the fact that, as part of the deal, they are asking Rodriguez to move to third base. Rodriguez is arguably the best defensive shortstop in baseball now, and Jeter…well, he’s one of the worst. Despite the defensive plays you’ve seen Jeter make in the playoffs, the statistics show that his defensive ability at shortstop is well below average. Historically speaking, this may prevent Alex Rodriguez from rightly claiming his title as the best shortstop in baseball history because an inferior player was already entrenched at the position. This is not a knock on Jeter’s offensive game; he’s still a fantastic offensive player. But moving Rodriguez to short is an absolute horrible use of your defensive resources.

The Economic Consequences

As any move by the Yankees ultimately does, the trade will reopen the ongoing dialogue on the disparity between the haves and have-nots. Invariably this problem is invariably placed on Yankees owner George Steinbrenner’s shoulders. What most people fail to realize is that Steinbrenner is operating entirely within the rules of baseball. The system is flawed, not certain “greedy” owners. Does baseball need a hard salary cap? I don’t think so; the real culprit is the disparity between media contracts. A true media revenue sharing would alleviate the vast majority of revenue differences between small and large markets. Of course, this may be impossible with the hodgepodge of media contracts in all the various baseball markets, not to mention the various difficulties in determining how much some franchises actually make. But I think that this should be the ultimate goal, not a reactionary hard salary cap.

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My Take on Kaz Tadano

Tadano, when he eventually reaches the majors, is going to be heckled; let’s not kid ourselves. Even though Tadano participated in a homosexual act, he is not gay; he has a serious girlfriend. But that’s meaningless judging by the homophobia rampant in this culture; Tadano is guilty by association in their eyes.

The Indians probably did the right thing by putting this out there during this time of the year; Spring Training is still a month away, and judging by the attention span of the national media, he’ll be a distant memory by Opening Day.

If Tadano becomes an effective major-league pitcher, the Indians deserve a lot of credit by being the only team to take a chance on him, even with all the negative backlash that will come from all the miscreants out there.

We as fans ignore many of our players’ transgressions because they can hit a curveball or throw a blazing fastball. Surely what Tadano has admitted to pales in comparison to what has been accepted from previous athletes in all sports. He only harmed himself, he’s sorry for it, and goodness knows he’s paid, unfairly or not, for what he did.

I think it’s time for us to concentrate on what he can do between the lines, not what he did several years ago and a continent away.

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#88 RHP Satchel Paige (1948-1949)

At age “41,” Leroy “Satchel” Paige became the first black pitcher in the American League. That year, Paige pitched in relief and helped the Indians to a championship in 1948. Over the next 4 years, he’d pitch for the Indians and St. Louis Browns, and came back in 1965 to pitch 3 innings for the Kansas City Athletics before finally retiring.

Unfortunately, by the time Paige was allowed into the majors, his best years were behind him. But even at an advanced age, Paige was a fine pitcher; during his first season in Cleveland, he went 6-1 with a 2.48 ERA out of the bullpen. However, his true greatness was spent with the Negro Leagues and in the Domincan Republic and Mexico. He was the biggest draw wherever he went, and his salary eclipsed most major leaguers’. His arsenal of pitches baffled hitters for five decades.

In 1971, he was inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame.

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#89 3B Larry Gardner (1919-1926)

Acquired in 1919, Gardner was a major cog in the 1920 World Series winner. During that year, he hit .310/.367/.414 and drove in 118. For the era he played in, Gardner was a pretty good hitter; most of his career was spent during the dead-ball era.

The first half of his career was spent with the Boston Red Sox, where behind pitcher Babe Ruth the Sox won a championship in 1915. He was traded to the Philadelphia Athletics after the 1917 season for star 1B Stuffy McInnis, and dealt to the Indians a year later along with Charlie Jamieson for Braggo Roth.

Gardner’s best season with the Indians came a year after the 1920 championship run; he hit .319/.391/.414 and drove in 120 runs.

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Back to the Present

Just a little break from the countdown.

I’m going to expound a little more on why the Indians are doing what they’re doing this year.

In a past post, I criticized the Tigers for giving Fernando Vina a two year contract, because:

a) He’s not worth $3M/year

b) He’s not going to be around on the next good Tiger team

c) He costs the Tigers financial flexibility

I’m going to concentrate on (c), because that is the main reason why the Indians signed who they signed this off-season. If you will assume the Indians’ projected year for competing for a championship (not the division) is 2005, then why should they sign players to multi-year deals this year? All that would do is to hamstring the Indians when they actually have a chance of winning. So they went out and signed “stopgaps”, or players who will be adequate players for a year and then disposed of. Ron Belliard, Jose Jiminez, Jeff D’Amico, and Jason Bere are all examples of this. These players were signed mainly because they needed certainty at their position. Belliard was signed because Brandon Phillips needs more seasoning, the starters were signed because of the inexperience of the young starters, and Jiminez was signed to provide depth to the bullpen.

Now why the one-year deals? This is where financial flexibility comes in. Let’s crunch some numbers.

Here’s who has guaranteed money coming in 2005:

$4.5M CC Sabathia

$6M Matt Lawton

That’s only $10.5M, which is amazing if you assume the Indians will have a payroll anywhere between $50-60M in 2005. They’ll use some of the money for increases in salary for arbitration-eligible players, but that shouldn’t be that big of an issue yet . We’ll assume $20M will be spent on re-signing the Indians’ arbitration-eligible players, as well as the players with 0-2 years of experience.

This leaves approximately $20M-$30M for the Indians to play with. This gives them tremendous flexibility to make any move they see fit to improve the team. After 2004, the Indians will have a much better idea as to where they’ll need help. If Brandon Phillips rebounds and has a good year, there’s no need to sign a second baseman (or shortstop). If Jhonny Peralta really takes off at short or third, that removes a need. If Jeremy Guthrie comes to Cleveland and pitches well, there’s another need removed.

The more needs are satisfied by your minor-leaguers (who are inherently cheaper than the equivalent free agent) the more money you’ll be able to spend on the needs that are left. This is why having a pipeline of young talent is so crucial, and the main reason why the Indians had to rebuild in the first place. If you have to spend money to fill holes via free agency, you really take up a lot of money. Now, if your team resides in New York or Boston, this isn’t really a big issue. But the Indians reside in a middling market, so they have to choose wisely who to spend on.

Now why spend in 2005 rather than 2004? Because the core really hasn’t shown it’s ready to win yet. There’s a lot of promise, but no objective observer is going to pencil in the Indians for 90 wins. But most agree that the talent is there; all that remains is for that talent to translate to wins. By next year, a lot of bad contracts are going to go away, which, coinciding with the maturation of the players who got their first taste of the majors last year, should make for the perfect opportunity to quickly become a contender.

Another reason why you don’t spend is that you don’t have that good an idea of whom to spend it on. Like I said previously, if Brandon Phillips rebounds, there’s no reason to sign a Luis Castillo. But if you signed him to a four-year deal, you have to pay him regardless. If the Indians signed a third baseman this offseason to a long-term contract and Corey Smith turns into Mike Schmidt next year, what do you do then? You’re stuck with a bunch of guaranteed contracts that really aren’t that useful to you, and in this day and age, you aren’t going to get rid of them very easily.

Now is this plan foolproof? No; projecting minor-league talent to major-league results is not exact, to say the least. But the Indians have stockpiled enough young talent to allow for some attrition. If more prospects go bust, then they’ll have that many more players to go get next off-season.

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#90 RHSP Orel Hershiser (1995-1997)

One of the best pitchers of the late 1980s, Hershiser came to the Indians in 1995 and showed that he had a couple of good years left. During the three years he spent in Cleveland, he posted an ERA+ of 119, 116, and 105. Thanks to Cleveland’s lethal offense, that translated to 16, 15, and 14 wins respectively.

But of course, Hershiser’s best season was in 1988, in which he was almost inhuman. He posted an ERA of 2.26, won the NL Cy Young, the NLCS MVP and pitched the Dodgers to the World Championship, picking up the World Series MVP in the process. Oh yeah, he also won the Gold Glove that year.

When the Indians went back to the World Series for the first time in 41 years by beating Seattle in 1995, Hershiser was the ALCS MVP.