Offseason Journal: Tradespace preparation

On Friday, the Indians declined to make Qualifying Offers to any of their pending free agents (Josh Donaldson was ineligible, as he’d been traded in 2018), including Michael Brantley, but even that wasn’t the most interesting news of the day.

This was:

Olney was also the first to report that the Indians weren’t going to tender a Qualifying Offer to Michael Brantley. The tweet above was followed up the following article at ESPN.com, which I recommend reading in place of the initial tweet. It gives a much better picture of what the Indians are signaling to the public. Assuming of course, that these leaks were intentional (which I believe they are). The Indians generally have been a tight-lipped organization, so something this frank is quite a surprise. But after thinking about, I understand why this leak happened.

This reporting is not designed to let other teams know what the Indians are planning, as Olney mentions that they had already told other teams about their general situation, but to prepare the fans for what otherwise may have been a shocking set of moves. I’m not sure that the Indians mentioned any of the named players specifically in the article, but you don’t have to be an insider to figure out what players are meant by “veterans”. Kluber and Carrasco are as valuable for their contracts as for their outstanding performance (not to mention the paucity of top-tier starting pitchers on the market), and Gomes and Perez are both admired for their defensive skills. Encarnacion and Kipnis are less valuable because of their contracts, but they are still good players. Kipnis in particular may be attractive for a team looking for a short-term fix at second base.

It has been my goal in this series of offseason posts to lay out the details of what the team faces this winter, and it’s nice to get as concrete a confirmation as you can have that my previous guesses are on the right track. I would have loved to have to heard the opposite from the team, that they were going to increase payroll another $20M or so in order to keep Michael Brantley and add at least one back-end reliever, but that doesn’t seem to be in the cards.

The Indians’ 2018 payroll was right in the middle of the pack of MLB teams ($136-137M, depending on which place you look), and it looks like that’s going to be a hard cap, at least for 2019. These aren’t the 00s clubs that routinely finished among the bottom ten teams in the league in payroll, but they aren’t the Yankees, Red Sox, or Dodgers, either. The Indians will be hosting the 2019 All-Star Game, so that should theoretically mean a bump in season tickets (as ASG ticket priority will undoubtedly be tied to them), not to mention revenue from the festivities themselves, but that’s probably only going to be a one-year bump. 2018 attendance actually fell a tiny bit from 2017 (thanks to a lot of early-season homestands), and that probably weighed more heavily in budgeting meetings.

But if the Indians were to shed payroll by trading a core player, they would risk entering into a payroll death spiral, with attendance falling precipitously as fans would see the loss of a familiar star rather than logic behind the move. That is why I think you saw the Olney story yesterday. The timing was such to explain not only the Brantley non-move, but also to prepare the fanbase for the types of moves that the Indians haven’t made since 2013. Over the last several years, the Indians’ roster has been remarkably stable, at least in terms of keeping the core together. They have let free agents go (Carlos Santana, for instance), but otherwise have not had any inclination towards trading a key player. If anything, they have acted more like a big market club in the past couple of years, readily trading top prospects for short and medium-term help(Andrew Miller, Brad Hand, among others), and even signing one of the more high-profile free agents of the 2016-2017 offseason (Edwin Encarnacion).

But eventually, as young players start to get raises, and as you buy more and more players at market rates, and as the revenue doesn’t rise as fast as the payroll does, a team like the Indians were going to have to make some difficult decisions. The reckoning comes quicker for a mid-market team than for a big-market club (coincidentally, the Cubs are in the same situation this winter), but lamenting about this disparity does not give you more money to spend.


A Sidebar: The (new) Qualifying Offer and why I think the Indians passed on Brantley

The 2017-2021 Collective Bargaining Agreement changed the Qualifying Offer process significantly, as its previous incarnation proved a millstone around the necks of many mid-level free agents. No longer do clubs signing a player who rejected a QO have to give up their first draft pick, among other changes that help free agents find new teams. To go into every single detail would bore practically every baseball fan, so I’ll just leave a link to this LGT article for those who live for roster and transactions minutiae. But there is one thing that is worth knowing in order to understand more about the Brantley decision.

  • A team receives a pick after the first round (#31-35) if the they receive revenue sharing (which the Indians do) AND the player receives a contract for at least $50M from another team. If the player receives a contract for less than that from another team, they receive in compensation a pick after the 2nd Competitive Balance Round, which has historically been in the #75-85 range.

So if the Indians thought that Brantley wouldn’t get more than a 3-year, $45M contract, their upside was getting in essence a third-round pick (along with its bonus money allotment). The downside would be Brantley accepting the offer, and painting the team into a corner. The 2018-19 Qualifying Offer is $17.9M, meaning that the 2019 Tribe payroll would already be $5M ahead of what it was in 2018 ($142M vs $137M). Now they do have the ability to cut salary via non-tendering arbitration-eligible players (such as Danny Salazar, who is set to make $5M), but they’d rather not have to do that, as just about everyone left on the roster are players that could help the team. It would also make it that much more difficult to get salary relief in trades (such as Jason Kipnis), as clubs would know the Indians have no room to negotiate.


With all that being said, here’s what the 2019 roster looks like if the Indians stand completely pat:

 

live link

I’ve replaced the 2018 bWAR actuals with the 2019 Steamer (Fangraphs) projections (fWAR), which is going to be more useful for players who didn’t get much playing time in 2018. For instance, Steamer projects Yandy Diaz to be worth 2.3 wins above replacement. Based on the Steamer projections, the Indians need to add 5.6 wins just to get back to their 2018 totals. And given the state of the AL Central last year, I don’t foresee it being as easy to earn those wins next year. On the salary side, the Indians can add $10-12M in payroll to reach last year’s totals. Given that WAR on the open market was worth $8-9M last year, the Indians aren’t going to be able to improve themselves much in free agency. That is why you are hearing these stories about trading a couple veterans to not only shed payroll, but improve the roster.

 

Offseason Journal: Carrasco’s option exercised, Guyer’s option declined

 

(live link to spreadsheet, with transactions list)

Today the Indians made decisions on two contract options. They exercised the 2019 option on Carlos Carrasco, which was as easy a decision as will be made this winter, but declined the 2019 option on Brandon Guyer, which was a bit a surprise to me, even taking into account the budgetary difficulties that the Indians will be facing this offseason.

The guaranteed portion of Carrasco’s contract ended in 2018, but the Indians have two team options that can keep him on team control through the 2020 season. The base value of the 2019 team option was $9.0M, but due to his fourth-place finish in the 2017 Cy Young voting, that option grew to $9.75M, but that’s still a tremendous bargain for an elite starting pitcher. As always, Cot’s Contracts (a great resource for transaction aficionados) has the details if you’d like to look more deeply into them.

Brandon Guyer’s situation is a bit simpler. The Indians had a single 2019 team option worth $3.0M, but instead they declined it, saving $2.75M in the process (Guyer will receive a $250K buyout). As Guyer now has over 6 years of service time, he’ll become a free agent in a couple days. I was surprised that the Indians declined the option because the $3.0M price tag, even for a role player, wasn’t high at all. The Indians certainly wouldn’t be able to sign a better fourth outfielder at that price, so that they elected to take the savings should tell you quite a bit about the budget uncertainties this winter.

From indians.com reporter Jordan Bastian:

The Indians front office is not going to let the public know what the actual salary limit will be, as that would hamstring in various negotiations throughout the winter, but declining Guyer’s option, as small as it was, does seem to be a sign that the team will be prioritizing savings in all forms in order to patch more important holes. The Indians don’t exactly have a stable of young corner outfielders ready to fill the role that Guyer played. Granted, Guyer’s role might not be needed by the time the Indians are done making moves this winter. Lonnie Chisenhall, who was Guyer’s main platoon partner, is also a free agent, and there’s no guarantee that Jason Kipnis will remain in the outfield next year (nevermind the roster). That makes this tweet make a bit more sense:

The outfield right now is basically a blank canvas. Center Fielder Leonys Martin is the closest outfielder you could term as a lock to be on the Opening Day roster, and he missed the last two months of the season to a life-threatening bacterial infection. So if the Indians do acquire two corner outfielders who happen to bat from the right side, there’d be no need for a Brandon Guyer. But even if that were so, they could have easily picked up Guyer’s option and traded him later should the outfield configuration have made him superfluous.

As opposed to the chaotic outfield, the rotation remains the bedrock of this roster, with Carrasco’s contract allowing the Indians to maintain one of the strongest starting staffs in baseball. A starting pitcher of Carrasco’s caliber would be worth at least double the $9.75M the Indians will be paying him in 2019, and the 2020 option isn’t that much different ($9.5M base rate, at $10.25M now and could jump higher based on where he finishes in the 2018 Cy Young voting). And the Indians don’t even have to make a decision on that option until after the 2019 season.

Offseason Journal: Setting the Parameters

 

The offseason begins today, and with it an avalanche of free agent speculation, trade rumors, and general strategic talk. I think the Indians will be much more active this winter than they have the last two offseasons, my basis for this being their 2018 performance (in both the regular and postseason) as well as the payroll itself.

I hope these two charts will clearly illustrate why I think this will be a wild hot stove season.

(Disclaimer: Past performance doesn’t correlate perfectly with future performance, both on an individual or a team level, this is just to illustrate the constraints the Indians find themselves in at this point in time.)

First, let’s look at the team’s performance in 2018.

(live version can be found here)

The above is one of my typical Excel charts listing the Indians’ 25-man/40-man rosters. There are a couple new things added that may be useful in providing some context that has been missing from these rosters: a comparison of total team Wins Above Replacement to the team’s competition in the American League. After all, what good is a statistic unless you have something to measure it against? I averaged the two flavors of WAR for each AL team, and ranked them at the bottom-right of the chart.

The Indians finished fourth in the AL by this measure, showing that if anything they should have had a better record (thanks, bullpen). The number used in comparison with the rest of the league is the total output of all players on the 2018 team, even those who had long-since been released by the team (the Oliver Drakes, the Alexi Ogandos, etc.)

I bring up these 2018 team numbers in order to focus the scope of offseason prognostication somewhat. I submit that if the Indians accumulate 50.6 WAR in 2019, they’ll make the playoffs again. Heck, they may make the playoffs if they hit 45.0 WAR if the rest of the AL Central continues to languish, but I don’t want to assume that, and neither should the Cleveland front office. Heck, if the competition in the AL Central gets better, it will be harder for the Indians to replicate that performance. So for the sake of this exercise, assume that the Indians will need to at least get to 50 wins above replacement.

This second chart concentrates more on the financial end of the equation.

 

The Indians ended 2018 with a roughly $137,400,000 payroll. The chart isn’t capturing the exact number, because the salaries of released players aren’t included, and many of the players on the list only made a partial salary (as they spent portions of the season making a minor-league salary), but it’s close enough for my purposes. Of that $137.4M salary, about $45M is going away via free agency, but a large portion of that savings is going to be eaten up by organic (arbitration and contract salary increases) growth.

To approximate the 2019 payroll if the Indians stand completely pat (letting all free agents walk, keeping everyone else), I’ve added back salaries for internal replacements for the free agents; for example, Tyler Olson/Neil Ramirez/Cody Anderson/Danny Salazar replacing the three free agent relievers plus Josh Tomlin. I calculate that the Indians, if they keep everyone on the roster that isn’t a free agent, will have an Opening Day payroll of $128,500,000, leaving the team about $9-10M to spend on bringing in new players if the salary budget remains the same in 2019.

Given that the free agents were worth 5.5 bWAR (and that includes the -0.9 bWAR that Josh Tomlin “contributed”), they aren’t going to be able to pay market value by signing free agents to make up for that lost production and be able to maintain their 2018 payroll (the market rate was between $8-9M/WAR last year). They should be able to replace some of that production with lower salary players (Yandy Diaz, for example, could help on that front as an everyday player), but there aren’t a lot of young players on the cusp of stepping into full-time roles. Maybe Tyler Naquin finally has a breakout season in right field, maybe Cody Anderson becomes the next Bryan Shaw, and maybe Danny Salazar becomes an elite closer, but I wouldn’t bet on all of these things happening.

So the Indians will need to both cut payroll and add talent. Cutting payroll could be as simple as non-tendering players like Danny Salazar, who is probably going to make $5M in arbitration, trading players like Jason Kipnis or Yonder Alonso in partial salary dumps, or even dealing core players like Trevor Bauer or Corey Kluber for total salary relief and young/talented players. Note that I’m not endorsing trading Bauer or Kluber unless the absolutely perfect deal comes around, but with the Indians’ circumstances, it’s a possibility. The Indians could also strip mine their farm system (where the talent is heavily concentrated in the lower rungs of the system) in order to patch the holes, putting all their eggs in the 2019-2020 baskets, all but ensuring the years after that will see a total rebuild.

One other thing to keep in mind is that several of the big market teams, after a couple years of restraint, are going to be extremely aggressive in free agency. The Yankees in particular are poised to spend wildly after having gotten under the luxury tax threshold in 2018 (thus avoiding a 50% surtax). That will affect not only the big names in free agency, but will have a trickle down effect on the lower tier free agents. That will make things more difficult for a team like the Indians to spend in free agency, but it might also make players like Kipnis and Alonso more attractive to teams that don’t want to spend the big bucks on a free agent.

So buckle in, Tribe fans…it’s going to be an interesting hot stove.

Postseason Journal: After the ALDS

Game 3 boxscore

When I used to do recaps at Let’s Go Tribe, the general rule was to have them up on the site less than hour after the final out. That was great for maximizing the exposure of the recap, as well as capturing the emotion of the reviewer (having written the piece during or just after having watched it, heart rate still elevated), but it also limited the amount of sober analysis you could do. After all, when bringing up a late blown lead in your recap just moments after it happened, you aren’t likely to stop to think that maybe, perhaps that fatal pitch wasn’t that bad. The next morning you might start to think in more nuanced terms, but by then it was too late, the game window had passed, with another one just beginning. In baseball, there’s rarely time to ponder a single game because the next game is bearing down on you.

I bring up this inside baseball (no pun intended) anecdote to illustrate the effect that Game 3 had (and still has) on me. I was fully prepared to write about it on Tuesday, the day after the game, but I still felt angry about both the game and the series, so I figured it would be best to wait a day. But on Wednesday, I felt the same way, still mad as heck about it. Thursday came, and yep, still fuming about how the team played. So here I am, on Friday night, five full days after Game 3, writing about it not because the anger has subsided but because it needs to be done, else it’ll fester in the back of my mind.


When Terry Francona made the call to go to Trevor Bauer in the sixth inning, it was with the express wish that he would bridge the gap to Brad Hand. Preferably that meant Bauer would go three innings, meaning that Hand would only have to make a three-out save. How do I know this? Even if Francona didn’t explicitly state that after the game, the fact that no reliever got up until well into Bauer’s meltdown in the seventh inning would have done it just as clearly. Yes, Tito distrusted his bullpen to that extent that he was pinning his entire hopes on a starting pitcher going three innings have pitched in relief in both Games 1 and 2. And I should remind you that this in a game in which the Indians led 2-1. Despite the awful offensive production, the Indians had a chance to win Game 3 thanks to Mike Clevinger’s outstanding performance against the Astros. The bad thing about Clevinger’s outing in Game 3 is that it took him 99 pitches to get through five innings. With a functional bullpen, that kind of outing is perfectly fine for playoff game, but with the raging dumpster fire that is the Tribe pen, it wasn’t going to be good enough.

It should also be noted that the offense, which had been among the best in the league as far as run prevention in the regular season, was just as culpable for the Game 2 and 3 losses as any Andrew Miller or Trevor Bauer or Cody Allen was. A reliever with a three-run lead is going to handle a situation much differently than one with a one-run lead, and perhaps have to pitch less cautiously may have helped with Miller in Game 2 or Bauer in Game 3. As much as I’ve been ragging on the bullpen, this embarrassment of an ALDS loss was a total team effort. I admit that the Astros have an outstanding collection of pitchers, but the Indians also had both an experienced and talented group of hitters to combat them.

So when Francona called upon Bauer to pitch, he was placing the starter in as difficult a situation as you could think of. Bauer, who hadn’t pitched out of the bullpen at any time in 2017 or 2018, was throwing for the third time in four days, and he was going to have to go multiple innings against a lineup that by now was very familiar with him with a one-run lead. And the funny thing is that if Bauer can simply make a throw to second, he would have gotten through at least two innings having given the Indians a chance to win. If he doesn’t make either throwing error, he might have gotten out of the seventh with the lead.

The events after Francona pulled Bauer actually validated Tito’s decision to insert Bauer into the game in the first place. Andrew Miller, Cody Allen, and Brad Hand, who on paper should have been the stalwarts of this series, allowed 6 runs and 1 inherited run to score in 1.2 innings pitched. When your best relievers are that bad, it’s just going to be impossible to win. Add to that a horrendous performance by the offense and some absolutely crucial errors (Melky Cabrera in Game 2, Trevor Bauer in Game 3) and you have the worst playoff performance in franchise history,* and although they had a legitimate chance to win two of the three games, statistically the series was one of the most lopsided in MLB history.

Was this historic beat down attributable to the Astros just being that much better than the Indians? I don’t think it’s that simple an explanation. The Astros were a better team than the Indians just looking a superficial things like record and the caliber of their division. The Indians were fortunate enough to play in one of the weakest divisions in modern history, while the Astros had to contend with the 97-win Oakland Athletics, who pushed them in the division race up until the final weeks of the regular season. But the Indians’  preparation/scouting (at compared to Houston’s) was lacking, not to mention the horrible execution of that game plan. Given the talent the Indians took to battle, to lose in the fashion they lost is just unacceptable.


So what now for the Indians? As mad as I still am with the way they played, they still have the makings of a great team. Their starting rotation, even accounting for some attrition (whether it be via injury or just diminishing abilities) is still among the best in baseball, and even if Michael Brantley leaves, there’s still a nice offensive core in place. The Indians have drafted well over the last several years, and that should help them be competitive on the trade market if that’s the way to want approach the offseason. A bullpen can be fixed without spending a lot of money or prospects, as opposed to the other areas on a team, though we didn’t see that play out in 2018. The AL Central still looks to be the Indians to lose even with expected improvements to every other team in the division. So this series loss, even as horrendous as it was, should not trigger any notion that the contention window is closed. But the Tribe front office has their work cut out for them, for reasons I’ll expand on in a future post.

*The Indians were swept in the 1954 World Series, outscored by 11 runs over four games. In the 2018 ALDS, the Indians were outscored by 15 runs over three game.

 

Postseason Journal: After ALDS Game 2

Game 2 boxscore

At the rate this is going, this series of posts is going to be rather limited.

Game 2 transpired in a way I imagined the losses to be at the beginning of the series, with the starter leaving with a small lead, only to see the bullpen give it up at the end of the game. What I did not expect is that the 6th inning of Game 2 to be such a essential distillation of that imagined outcome. Carlos Carrasco was pulled in the sixth inning after allowing an infield hit (which was actually more of an unforced decision by Josh Donaldson, who picked up a squibber off the bat of Jose Altuve, even though it was going foul, because Altuve had stumbled out of the box) and a walk. Prior to that, Carrasco had had some difficulties, but seemed in control of the game. Andrew Miller came into the game, allowed a double (that should have been scored a single and an error), then lost total command and was summarily pulled in favor of Trevor Bauer.

That inning encapsulated the team’s fatal flaw, something you could see playing out in the span of 10 minutes or so, which made it so visceral even to fans who didn’t follow the team that closely. That flaw is the bullpen, and particularly the relievers that two years ago were the bedrock on which an AL championship was built. By going to Miller in the sixth, Francona believed he was going to the Andrew Miller of 2016, but that Andrew Miller doesn’t exist right now. Perhaps in the future he’ll become a great relief ace again; I’m not declaring him finished as an effective pitcher. But I am saying that in 2018, he’s not somebody that is going to dominate a lineup, never mind get out of a jam like he was brought into in the sixth inning on Saturday. Had the Indians been able to discover/develop even a modest version of the 2016 Andrew Miller, I don’t think Francona would have brought in the 2018 Miller. Instead, with no real relief alternatives, he was banking on some residue of magic from someone who had at least done it in the past.

Which is why I would have stuck with Carrasco in that situation, even though playoff doctrine dictates that you pull a starter at the first sign of real trouble. Rely on your strengths, even if that comes with risk, rather than casting your lot with your weakness. Carrasco was facing the top of the Houston order for the third time, but given what we know about the Tribe bullpen right now, I thought it was a more acceptable risk to allow Carrasco to face the middle of the Astros lineup for the third time than to bring in Andrew Miller to face them once. If you are going to lose the series, lose it by forcing your opponent to beat your strongest part.

It also must be mentioned that the Tribe offense set the stage for that fatal flaw to be attacked. Scoring just one run in seven innings, no matter how great the pitcher, is not an acceptable outcome for an offense very capable of at the very least making a dominant pitcher work hard for his outs. This lineup is full of talented young players as well as experienced ones, and some of the at-bats against Gerrit Cole were just not up the standards that I’ve seen those players establish.

And so we’re in the lamentable prospect of being swept in the first round of the playoffs. The good news is that teams have regularly come back from 0-2 deficits to win series, something that should be seared into Tribe fans’ minds after the events of last year. The bad news is that I don’t see how this team can do it in the absence of stellar starting pitching, with two of the starts being made by a rookie pitcher who is still growing into the majors (Bieber) and a veteran pitcher who was by his standards awful in Game 1 (Kluber). And even if the Indians get great starting pitching, I’m not confident at all that they’d be able to scrape together even two shutout innings in relief.

I know a deficit brings out the pessimist in every baseball fan, even those who were pessimistic to begin with, but it’s really hard to see, after the lost opportunity in Game 2, to pull this series out. By nature, I’m an optimist when it comes to the Indians, especially over the last 5 seasons. I still think this team has at least one more run in them. But this year’s run? I think it’s over. Prove me wrong, Tribe. Please.

 

Postseason Journal: After ALDS Game 1

Game 1 boxscore

After yesterday’s rather disappointing game (and that’s putting it mildly), there’s been a lot of thoughts swirling around my brain. This is an attempt to sort them out.

In my mind the key to the Indians winning in this postseason is to rely heavily on the starting rotation. It’s apparent that Cody Allen isn’t the same pitcher he was in 2016 (or even 2017 for that matter), even after the numerous attempts to “fix” his mechanics during the season. Andrew Miller has alternated between injury and ineffectiveness the entire season, and while he may be at his best heading into the ALDS, that best is a far cry from vintage Miller, where you could put him in and immediately start planning for two innings from then. Brad Hand and Oliver Perez have been great additions, but aren’t going to be enough to cover the back end of a game unless the Indians get tremendous starting performances.

That’s why yesterday’s game was so disturbing. The path to victory was that Corey Kluber would outpitch Justin Verlander, and the bullpen would hang on at the end. Had the Astros won in a close game or pulled away late, I’d be down (as for any postseason loss) but would be understanding of it. After all, a weak bullpen has been a given all season. But Kluber’s performance, beyond the line score, is what is unsettling. Kluber struck out just two hitters yesterday. Just two! His velocity was down at least two miles per hour. He was missing out of and in the strike zone. That isn’t just the Astros lineup not missing mistakes, that’s Kluber not being the Kluber that we’ve seen all year, even at the end of the campaign. I don’t think Kluber is injured, otherwise Francona would at the very least have elevated Carlos Carrasco to the Game 1/5 slot. That slot is very important, as the pitcher who starts Game 1 is the only starting pitcher to make two starts in the ALDS. After today’s loss, the chances that the Indians can both win the season and do it in 4 games is rather small, so Kluber is going to have to pitch again for the Indians to have any chance of advancing, and based on what I saw yesterday, that’s not something to look forward to, whether it’s bad mechanics (more likely) or injury (less likely, and let’s hope that it isn’t the case).

This is where the strategy I laid out earlier collapses if the Tribe rotation isn’t at full strength. When Terry Francona reluctantly had to go to the bullpen in the fifth inning, the options just aren’t there to hold the opposition in check. Dan Otero and Adam Cimber made the postseason roster by default, not because they pitched their way into it. Neil Ramirez, the last reliever cut, has been awful over the past several months, so I’m not going to blame the roster choices for the performance, but the overall pool of players. That’s why I think Trevor Bauer is being used in a role that doesn’t suit his ability at all. Bauer was brought into a game in which the Indians were trailing in the sixth inning, replacing the guy who started the year as a co-closer. That should give an idea as to what Terry Francona thinks of the bullpen right now. And if you have to use Bauer in a short relief role, you can’t use him as a bridge type of pitcher  or even as a starter in the series. I imagined Bauer’s role as a finisher, coming into the game in the sixth or seventh inning and pitching the remainder of it, like the Astros used Charlie Morton in Game 7 of the World Series last year.

That’s why using Bauer in as low leverage a situation as you can get the playoffs was so puzzling. Sure, don’t plan on Trevor going deep into a game, but for goodness’ sakes, he’s one of your best 3 pitchers on the roster even after the injury!

The Indians have the talent to still pull off the series win, so don’t take the preceding as a acknowledgement of impending defeat. But as yesterday’s game showed, in order for them to win, the Indians absolutely need Carlos Carrasco, Mike Clevinger, and whoever ends up starting Games 4 and 5 to be at the top of their games, because if it becomes a bullpen game, the Indians are going to lose.

 

 

Rooting for NL madness – September 30

Even though my wildest dream did not come true, I’ll certainly take this:

The Cardinals were eliminated from contention with the Dodgers winning yesterday, meaning that all four of the teams pictured above are in the playoffs, but they want to avoid playing in Tuesday’s single-elimination Wild Card game, even if that means having to play a tiebreaker tomorrow. The calculus is simple: if the Cubs/Brewers and/or Rockies/Dodgers are tied in the standings after today’s games, they’ll play a tiebreaker on Monday*, and the loser(s) of those games would have to play in the Wild Card game on Tuesday, with the NL Central team hosting the NL West team.

Because the pairs are tied, the concurrent start times (at 3PM Eastern) won’t make the teams play any different than they would if the games were staggered, but as a fan, it makes this afternoon absolutely fantastic. All four games will be decided within a 3-4 hour window. Of the four pitching staffs, I think the Rockies may be the best positioned, as they were blown out yesterday, and therefore didn’t use the back end of their bullpen, while the other three teams did. That may come into play Monday or even Tuesday, as you’d have key relievers pitching for the fourth (or even fifth) day in a row. No matter what happens, at the very least we’ll have an afternoon of compelling baseball on this final day of the regular season, a nice appetizer for October baseball.

*Cubs would host the Brewers, while the Dodgers would host the Rockies.

Rooting for NL madness – September 29

 

St. Louis has ruined any possibility of a multi-day tiebreaker in the National League by losing four straight games, but with two days left in the regular season, there are still three different possibilities for tiebreakers, with two of them being mutually exclusive (NL West and Wild Card #2). So there could be two tiebreaker games played, with both of them on Monday.

NL Central

This one is rather simple. The Cubs lead the Brewers by a game, with both teams having clinched playoff spots. If they do end up tied, they’ll play a tiebreaker, with the loser hosting the Wild Card game. Either team would win the division outright without having to play a tiebreaker.

CHC (2 STL) 1-1 ->95-67
MIL (2 DET) 2-0 ->95-67

OR

CHC (2 STL) 0-2 ->94-67
MIL (2 DET) 1-1 ->94-67

NL West

The Rockies have clinched a playoff spot, meaning that the Dodgers would clinch one as well if they catch Colorado. It would be a similar scenario as in the NL Central, with the loser heading to either Milwaukee or Chicago for the Wild Card game. Either team could still win the division outright without playing a tiebreaker.

COL (2 WAS) 1-1->91-71
LAD (2 @SF) 2-0->91-71

OR

COL (2 WAS) 0-2->90-72
LAD (2 @SF) 1-1->90-72

Wild Card #2

If the Cardinals win out and the Dodgers lose out, they would play a tiebreaker for the second Wild Card spot.

LAD (2@SF) 0-2 ->89-73
STL (2@CHC) 2-0 ->89-73

There are six different combinations for Monday tiebreakers (including none at all):

  • NL Central, NL West
  • NL Central, Wild Card #2
  • NL Central
  • NL West
  • NL Wild Card #2
  • No tiebreakers

With only 2 days left in the regular season, that’s kind of crazy that there are still that many possibilities. Meanwhile, in the American League, there is absolutely nothing at stake (including seeding). So thank goodness for the NL!

 

Rooting for NL madness – September 26

The 5-team tie is still possible, but there is no more room for error, as now the record has to be 91-71, not 92-70, as the Cardinals cannot get to 92 wins now. The Cubs have done their part, losing two straight at home to the Pirates. St. Louis losing two games at home to the Brewers is what is gumming up the works, though.  The Cubs would have to lose all 5 of their remaining games, which normally would seem very unlikely, but 3 of those games are against the Cardinals. The biggest hurdle to tiebreaker chaos is actually the Brewers going 0-4 to end the season, as 3 of those games are at home against the lowly Detroit Tigers.

CHC (2 PIT, 3 STL) 0-5 ->91-71
MIL (1@STL, 3 DET)0-4 ->91-71
LAD (1@ARI, 3@SF) 3-1->91-71
COL (2 PHI, 3 WAS)4-1->91-71
STL (1 MIL, 3@CHC) 4-0->91-71

2 games to determine the NL Central division winner (CHC-MIL-STL) – Monday-Tuesday
1 game to determine the NL West division winner (LAD-COL) – Monday
2 games to determine the 2 teams in the Wild Card game – Wednesday-Thursday
1 NL Wild Card game – Friday

If St. Louis defeats the Brewers tonight and the Cubs win, the best outcome would be a four-way tie involving the Brewers, Dodgers, Rockies, and Cardinals. That would mean the Dodgers and Rockies would play on Monday to decide the NL West, with the losers participating in a three-team, two-day tiebreaker with the Brewers and Cardinals. The same records would apply as in the five-team scenario above, just with the Cubs removed. In this scenario, the Cubs would still win the NL Central even if they lost their final four games.

MIL (1@STL, 3 DET)0-4 ->91-71
LAD (1@ARI, 3@SF) 3-1->91-71
COL (2 PHI, 3 WAS)4-1->91-71
STL (1 MIL, 3@CHC) 4-0->91-71

1 game to determine the NL West division winner (LAD-COL) – Monday
2 games to determine the 2 teams in the Wild Card game (NL West loser-MIL-STL) – Tuesday-Wednesday
1 NL Wild Card game – Thursday

If the Cubs lose out but Milwaukee wins at least one game this weekend, this four-way tie could also happen (with Milwaukee winning the NL Central):

CHC (2 PIT, 3 STL)0-5 ->91-71
LAD (1@ARI, 3@SF) 3-1->91-71
COL (2 PHI, 3 WAS)4-1->91-71
STL (1 MIL, 3@CHC) 4-0->91-71

1 game to determine the NL West division winner (LAD-COL) – Monday
2 games to determine the 2 teams in the Wild Card game (NL West loser-CHC-STL) – Tuesday-Wednesday
1 NL Wild Card game – Thursday

If St. Louis loses to Milwaukee tonight, the best outcome for tiebreaker aficionados would be two separate ties; a tie for the NL Central (Cubs-Brewers) and a tie for the NL West (Dodgers-Rockies). This has many different ways to happen, given that both division leaders are hanging on by just one-half a game. The two losers would then face each other in the NL Wild Card game.

Here’s one of many scenarios in which you could have two separate ties:

CHC (2 PIT, 3 STL) 4-1 ->95-67
MIL (1@STL, 3 DET)4-0 ->95-67

LAD (1@ARI, 3@SF) 3-1->91-71
COL (2 PHI, 3 WAS)4-1->91-71

1 game to determine the NL West division winner (LAD-COL) – Monday
1 game to determine the NL Central division winner (CHC-MIL) – Monday
1 NL Wild Card game  – Tuesday

Rooting for NL madness – September 24

As someone who yearns one year to see a crazy series of tiebreakers at the end of the regular season, the National League presents a very intriguing scenario, in contrast to the American League (which might have all the seeding complete before the weekend).

There is a possibility of having 6 teams in the NL finish with the same record, and 5 of those teams having to play at least one tiebreaker (Atlanta has already clinched their division, and they wouldn’t have to participate, as determining seeding in the NLDS doesn’t require a tiebreaker game).

The most likely ending record for a 5-way tie is 92-70. Here’s what the other 5 contenders would have to do this week in order to set up that tie:

CHC (4 PIT, 3 STL) 1-6 (with at least 2 losses against STL)
MIL (3@STL, 3 DET)3-3 (with at least 2 losses against STL)
LAD (3@ARI, 3@SF) 5-1
STL (3 MIL, 3@CHC)5-1
COL (4 PHI, 3 WAS) 7-0

Colorado has the longest odds, as not only do they have the worst record of the contenders, but have to rely on outside help to get them into a tiebreaker, while St. Louis largely controls their own destiny, as they play both Milwaukee and the Cubs this week.

If all 5 teams tie, here would be the winner-take-all games next week in the National League:

2 games to determine the NL Central division winner (CHC-MIL-STL) – Monday-Tuesday
1 game to determine the NL West division winner (LAD-COL) – Monday
2 games to determine the 2 teams in the Wild Card game – Wednesday-Thursday
1 NL Wild Card game – Friday

There are many other less crazy scenarios even if this one doesn’t line up, but for now I’m rooting for the five-way tie. I’ll update these scenarios as the season draws to a close.