Ryan

Signed RHSP Kevin Millwood to a one year, $7M contract

The contract is technically worth $7M, but the Indians are only on the hook for $3M if Millwood gets hurt. The other $4M is a “signing bonus,” contingent on Millwood’s pitching arm. If he spends 20 or more days on the disabled list because of an arm injury, 1/183rd of that signing bonus goes away for every subsequent day Millwood is on the DL. If you’re wondering where the 183 comes from, that refers to the number of days in a baseball season. So if Millwood pulls a Bere and doesn’t pitch at all, the Indians owe him $3M. If he pitches less than 190 innings but his arm holds up, they owe him $7M. Millwood can also earn an extra $1M in performance bonuses according to Andy Call of the Repository. The bonuses are mainly based on innings pitched.

This is an outstanding deal for both sides. Millwood didn’t get the attention other pitchers got because of his elbow, and is now in a situation where he can re-enter the market next season and cash in. The Indians get a pitcher who, when he’s healthy, is at the very least a solid number 3 starter for a one year deal with very little financial risk. Baseball Prospectus, whose work I generally like, panned the deal even before it happened. They compared Millwood to Wade Miller, who also signed an incentive-laden contract this offseason, stating that paying Millwood $7M is too much. Frankly (and I say this as a subscriber to BPro), I disagree. Here’s their argument:

Miller and Millwood were fairly comparable in 2002-03 (combined VORP of 67.4 for Millwood and 60.7 for Miller). Both ran into arm trouble last year and missed a considerable number of starts. When they did pitch, though, Miller was superior, boasting a VORP of 21.8 to Millwood’s 9.3. Both have comparable strikeout rates (within a quarter-K per nine). Miller is two years younger.

Millwood, of course, has more “experience.” Now, if they were in the first few years in the bigs and playing at the major-league minimum, then experience would count because it’s codified in the Collective Bargaining Agreement to be that way. It doesn’t have to be that way in the unprotected, free-wheeling, every-man-for-himself world of free agency, though. If the Indians want to reward Millwood for having pitched in the big leagues longer than Miller or because he ripped it up real good back in 1999, then give him an additional 500 EBFB (extra big fun bucks). To our way of thinking, the Red Sox established what the market value is for moderately successful starting pitchers coming off injuries is when they signed Miller to one year at $1.5 mil. Because of that, anything beyond $2 million for Millwood is excessive on the Indians’ part.

The experience comment is a red herring, in my opinion. All the Indians were looking for is starting pitching help for 2005, preferrably from a pitcher who was healthy. The difference between Millwood’s and Miller’s years of service probably had little to do with their respective contract offers; their injuries did (Miller has a shoulder problem, and Millwood’s injury was with his elbow). The Indians put Millwood through what I can safely call an exhaustive battery of medical tests to make sure Millwood’s arm was healthy, and further covered their bases with the non-guaranteed signing bonus. Stating that the Indians are offering Millwood more money than Miller just because he’s pitched more innings doesn’t really make sense to me. And since both contracts are a season apiece, does age really matter? Of course, Prospectus may change its tune when they see the details of the contract, but even at $7M I don’t mind the deal at all.

It looks like things are starting to happen with Kevin Millwood and his agent, Scott Boras. WTAM and AP writer Tom Withers are both saying that Millwood is close to signing with the Indians for about $7M plus incentives. The Indians put Millwood’s arm under the microscope, and apparently they’re satisfied that he’ll be healthy for 2005. Millwood would probably slot behind CC Sabathia and Jake Westbrook in the rotation, although I think Millwood should be better than Jake. This would also move Jason Davis to the bullpen, where he may be more effective. If the Indians can get 210 innings out of Millwood, they’d have to be thrilled. If he gets injured, the rotation’s in trouble in 2005, but they also won’t have his salary on the books in 2006. I’d really like for there to be a team option for next year…maybe $8-9M, but Boras is probably smarter than that; If Millwood is good enough to warrant the Indians picking up the option, he could get much more money (and years) from another team. Either way, it’s a nice value signing for the Indians.

The other day, the Indians announced they had sold Erick Almonte to the Nippon Ham Fighters of the Japanese Pacific League. For Almonte, this is a great move; he’ll make a lot more money in Japan, and could parlay a good season in Japan to a major-league deal next season. For the Indians, they lose their Plan C shortstop. He would have been a nice 25th man, or at the very least a fallback in Buffalo.

Now what about Juan Gonzalez? I’ll admit that bringing Juan back didn’t even enter the picture when thinking about who the Indians would target. If it’s a minor-league deal, great; the team gets to see if Juan’s back is fine, and see how he looks. What I can’t understand is where he’d fit in if he does make the club. Justice B. Hill speculates that Coco Crisp would move to center, and Grady Sizemore would be optioned to Buffalo. I don’t see that happening unless Sizemore is hurt; Grady is ready for the majors, and sending him back to AAA wouldn’t do much good at all. Juan could be Aaron Boone insurance; if Boone couldn’t play early in the season, Casey Blake would move back to third, and Juan would take over in right. Or maybe the Indians want him to challenge Ryan Ludwick for the backup outfielder’s job. Given his durability issues, a part-time role might work out; but Juan has never had any real platoon splits. I guess I’ll have to hold judgment until I see how the Indians envision Juan’s role on the team if he makes the club.

Finally, John at ‘Till You’re Blue in the Face has his Michael Aubrey scouting report up. While you’re there, check his other prospect reports out. Also, I’d like to welcome to the Indians blogosphere Knuckleball Sandwich and Tribe Report. Hopefully you’ll make them part of your daily surf.

Today the Baseball Writers Association voted two players into the Hall of Fame: Wade Boggs and Ryne Sandberg. Both are well deserving players, but there’s two others that I felt were snubbed. For whatever reason, Bert Blyleven and Alan Trammell haven’t got the traction that they should have by now, and I really don’t understand why. Well, given that these are baseball writers voting, nothing ever really surprises me, but let me state their cases, and you can be the judge.

Bert Blyleven (1970-1992)
Career PRAR: 1496
Career WARP3: 139.3
Career Strikeouts: 3701 (5th All-Time)
Career ERA+: 118
Complete Games: 242
Shutouts: 60 (9th All-Time)

Given that Blyleven, if he’s ever voted in, would become one of the better pitchers enshrined in the Hall, the lack of attention just mystifies me. One of the only knocks on Bert is his 250 losses, but that in no way makes Blyleven a worse pitcher. It’s not really his fault that he played on really bad teams during his tenure. All a pitcher can control when on the mound is himself; he cannot control how many runs his team scores, or how effective his bullpen is, or how good the defense behind him is. To not vote for Blyleven based on his career record is asinine. And that’s what about 60% of the voters did this year.

Only eight pitchers have more shutouts than Blyleven: Walter Johnson, Grover Cleveland Alexander, Christy Mathewson, Cy Young, Eddie Plank, Warren Spahn, Nolan Ryan, and Tom Seaver. All of them are in the Hall of Fame. The next THIRTEEN pitchers on the list are in the Hall of Fame.

Only four pitchers have more strikeouts than Blyleven: Nolan Ryan, Roger Clemens, Randy Johnson, and Steve Carlton. All are Hall of Famers or certain Hall of Famers. The next NINE pitchers on the list are in the Hall of Fame or a certain Hall of Famer (Greg Maddux).

I’ve yet to hear a cogent argument why Blyleven should not be in the Hall, yet the voters keep leaving him off their ballots.

Allen Trammell (1977-1996)
Career BRAR: 422
Career FRAR: 460
Career WARP3: 114.2
Career OPS+: 110

During his career, Trammell was one of the best shortstops in the game. He finished in the MVP voting thrice, finishing second in 1987. He won four Gold Gloves. In an era where an offensive shortstop wasn’t commonplace, Trammell was a true offensive weapon. He won a championship with the Tigers in 1984, and was the World Series MVP, so the “winning” arguments some use against Blyleven don’t apply to him. I guess the fact that not only do the voters not vote him in, but leave him off so many ballots altogether bugs me the most; Trammel only appeared on 16.9% of the ballots, and writers may vote for ten players each year. Trammell’s double play partner, Lou Whitaker, dropped off the ballot in his first year of eligibility, which to me smacks of an unintended consequence of some writers not believing Whitaker a “first-ballot Hall of Famer”, thus leaving him off their ballots. Yes, Whitaker failed to receive 5% of the vote.

Yes, I’d rather the Hall of Fame keep its standards high, so that marginal players don’t sneak in; lowering the percentage for induction is not a solution. But by the same token, when (in my estimation) no-brainers continually get shut out, I start to wonder whether some voters really take their votes seriously.

The start of anything new offers you a great opportunity for introspection. Given that I’ve never really said what this blog is about, the dawn of a new year is as good a time as any.

First of all, let me start out by saying that I’m a baseball fan first, and an Indians fan second. What that means: I’m probably as passionate about the Tribe as anyone I’ve met, but that passion stems from a love of baseball in general. The fact that I grew up in Northeast Ohio just means I happened to become a fan of the Indians. And that wasn’t real easy given that my first recollections of the Indians was watching the 1985 team on WUAB. Of course watching the next, oh, decade of Indians baseball wasn’t that great either, but I guess it gave me a sort of tolerance for awful teams that others may not have. Every time someone writes the PD complaining about the Indians, I laugh and remember 1991. The Internet (at least as we know it now) wasn’t around, but if it was, I could imagine the weeping and gnashing of teeth. Heck, John Hart was just starting to implement his rebuilding plan (the 20th or so version since 1959), and although the talent was definitely there in retrospect, the results on the field didn’t show it. That was the season I really got into Indians baseball, the year I would listen or watch as many games as I could. You could say that I picked the wrong year to start closely paying attention to the team, but I was more fascinated in the game itself, the intracacies that baseball alone could offer. That I loved watching a 57-105 team speaks volumes about the sport itself, and since then nothing, including player strikes, owner lockouts, steroids, Jose Mesa, Interleague play, All-Star games which ended in ties, and the New York Yankees could make me give it up.

I’m fascinated with baseball mainly because it’s run so differently than other sports. It’s not a TV-friendly sport like football is. It’s not as flashy as the NBA is, and not as brutal (in a nice way) as the NHL. It features a lot of guys mostly standing around on a field waiting for one guy to throw a ball. But the farther you delve into the sport, the more it sucks you in. The immense strategy it offers, the dizzying numbers of statistics, the massive number of players to keep track of, it’s storied and relevent history to study, and sometimes, its indescribable beauty has kept me interested since then.

The dismantling of the team starting in 2002 gave me the impetus to start what eventually became this blog, because it allowed me to revisit the rebuilding I grew up watching. Will this scheme work just like the Hank Peters/John Hart plan? No, because it’s different; even if it succeeds, it will succeed in different ways from the mostly organic approach employed in the early 1990s. Hart exploited the six years of control a team has over a player to perfection through his long-term contracts, but really couldn’t adapt afterwards. Mark Shapiro has employed a sort of hybrid between the Athletics plan of exploiting market inefficiencies through statistical analysis and the more traditional scouting concepts that clubs like the Atlanta Braves have used for years. Gone are the long-term deals for the most part; Shapiro is more willing to go to arbitration instead. If Westbrook, Blake, or Riske do so, it would be the first case since…you guessed it…1991. The Indians aren’t really a Moneyball organization, but aren’t a pure tools organization, either. Both concepts (or even a hybrid of the two) will work if executed correctly; the Twins and Athletics are great examples of teams that have won using drastically different methods. The key is to determine what works for your organization, execute it, and be consistent with it. That in my opinion is what every successful organization does. And that’s why each GM can succeed with different environments, characteristics, and preferences.

So where does this blog fit in? It, in essence, is the pursuit of determining how exactly a baseball organization in today’s environment can win. Yes, I give you my uneducated view on player moves after they happen, but the most instructive analysis in my opinion when you step back, add some context, and look objectively at a baseball organization. Too often I think we look at something in isolation and extrapolate an opinion from so minute a sample that it’s worthless. So while I definitely focus on the present, I mix in some of that all-important context from time to time; that means asking and trying to answer larger questions. Right now, one of those larger questions that has been brought to the forefront is a player’s value based on past performance. Or in other words, how much money is a Jaret Wright or a Carl Pavano really worth, given their fairly short periods of success? And is it worth overpaying for them, given a small payroll? Examining current trends in baseball is just as important; for example, the San Francisco Giants have decided to forego draft picks in an attempt to win now. Will that work, and what would be the long-term effects of their version of the early 1970s Washington Redskins? Again, it might work for the Giants, who happen to have one the best players in baseball history nearing retirement, but it might be disastrous for other teams on the other side of the Success Cycle. I think looking at the broader picture is a lot more interesting than micro-analyzing who got lost in the AAA portion of the Rule 5 Draft. I can do both, but there’s really only so much I can say about a 25-year-old minor-league reliever without repeating myself.

That’s where context comes in. Baseball has a lot of history, and if you can harness it, you can come up with some interesting conclusions. Yes, each player presents his own unique traits that sometimes defies prediction, but the more you delve into what makes a prospect turn into a major-league star, you can start to see patterns emerge. And going up a level, you can start to see characteristics of successful organizations. Though sportswriters today aren’t really expected to step back a little when examining a club, I think it’s a necessary ingredient for thoughtful analysis. It’s much easier to criticize a player during an 0-30 slump than to say that, given his career numbers, he’ll be all right. The former sells newspapers, and the latter just sounds like a hedge. But that’s what baseball is about; a batting average doesn’t care that you went through a horrid hitting slump in August, it just cares that you hit .290 for the entire season. Baseball is about context and bodies of work, not one play during a Sunday matinee in June.

To take things to a higher level, organizational moves are also best viewed in context, but that may mean waiting a long period of time before reaching a conclusion. When the Indians started to sell off players in 2002, it was certainly easy to declare the club was going back to the Dark Ages of the 70s and 80s because there was no real hard data to refute it, beyond minor-league data and faith. When the Indians signed Ronnie Belliard instead of Todd Walker, the move was roundly criticized (no pun intended). Now that he’s back for another season, the move was mostly lauded. Hindsight is a tool easily used and easily abused; foresight is elusive and, if used properly, deadly. Moneyball wasn’t really about OBP per se; it was about finding undervalued commodities and using them to your advantage. Determining what’s undervalued is one of a GM’s hardest jobs. The Indians use a computer system called DiamondView to help out with the number crunching, but deciding what to target given the teams’ needs can’t be determined by a computer printout; it takes the aforementioned foresight in concert with experience and sometimes just plain old luck to get a player like Belliard for $1M. That’s how teams with low payrolls can get better players than teams with higher payrolls. Another way of course is by drafting them; an organization controls a player for 6 years if they can develop them. That 6 years of control is a key reason why a well-stocked farm system is almost imperative for lower-payroll teams to win in today’s financial environment. To collect a lot of cheap, young talent, you have to draft or sign it, and this time you’re essentially on a level playing field with the whales of baseball. So you again must find undervalued (as far as talent goes) players and draft them, but this time you take the same amount of risk as the big boys. The reasoning behind a player move is just as important than the move itself; otherwise, why not use a random number generator to build your team?

Whether the current “Blueprint for Success” actually succeeds on the field, where a GM is ultimately evaluated, is relevant only to the extent that we can say why or why not it suceeded. That “why” question is the main reason I’m here, and hopefully we’ll answer it together.

Cleveland has seen exactly one Hall of Fame catcher play for them, Buck Ewing. And he played for the Cleveland Spiders in the 19th century. So this group of seven backstops doesn’t quite have the luster as other positions will. But there’s still some interesting players, including two players (Ray Fosse and Sandy Alomar) who had their careers curtailed because of injuries, a defensive specialist (Jim Hegan), and one catcher (Luke Sewell) who probably made the list because they needed a seventh man.

Now determining the worth of a catcher is probably the most difficult of any position on the diamond. What’s more valuable, a great defensive catcher, or a slugging backstop? While this ranking won’t answer that question, mainly because there aren’t a lot of power-hitting catchers on this list, it was interesting to see who actually came out ahead in this exercise.

In reverse order:

(7) Luke Sewell (1921-1932, 1939)
Cleveland BRAR: 5.0
Cleveland FRAR: 137
Cleveland WARP3: 15.6
How Acquired: CLE-WASH trade

Brother of Hall of Famer Joe Sewell, Luke took over for Steve O’Neill in 1926, and was the Indians’ starter for the next seven seasons. After the 1932 season, he was dealt to the Washington Senators for catcher Roy Spencer. After retiring as a player, he guided the St. Louis Browns to their one and only World Series appearance in 1944. As a player, Sewell’s resume doesn’t look that impressive; he was an All-Star once (1937), but that was as a member of the Chicago White Sox. If Victor Martinez has two more good seasons, he should pass Sewell.

(6) Ray Fosse (1967-1972, 1976-1977)
Cleveland BRAR: 71
Cleveland FRAR: 105
Cleveland WARP3: 20.5
How Acquired: Selected (1st Round) in 1965 Amateur Draft

Most fans associate Fosse with the 1970 All-Star Game and Pete Rose. Fosse had been enjoying a breakout season with the Indians, making the All-Star Team in his first full year with the club. But after Rose slammed into him, he never was the same player again; the 18 home runs he hit in 1970 was his high-water mark. He eventually had to retire in 1979 due a multitude of injuries, but I still wonder how good he’d have been if he’d have been relatively healthy in his mid-to-late 20s. But thanks to Charlie Hustle, we’ll never know.

(5) Joe Azcue (1963-1970)
Cleveland BRAR: 76
Cleveland FRAR: 105
Cleveland WARP3: 22.3
How Acquired: CLE-KCA trade

Azcue was acquired from the KC Athletics on May 25, 1963, in a deal which saw Doc Edwards (future Indians manager) and Dick Howser (future Royals manager) also included. Azcue got into the starting lineup after the Indians’ starting catcher, Johnny Romano broke his hand. Romano was dealt the following season to Chicago, and Azcue platooned with Duke Sims until he was dealt to Boston in 1969.

(4) Johnny Romano (1960-1964)
Cleveland BRAR: 151
Cleveland FRAR: 74
Cleveland WARP3: 26.2
How Acquired: CLE-CHA trade

The best hitting catcher in Indians’ history, Romano slugged .475, .483, and .493 in his first three seasons with the Indians. He fractured his hand in 1963, and after losing his job to Joe Azcue was dealt in a blockbuster that saw the return of Rocky Colavito, and the losses of Tommie Agee and Tommy John. Romano battled weight problems early in his career, but was a valuable player after getting his break with the Indians. His FRAR ranks as the lowest among the seven Indians catchers.

(3) Sandy Alomar, Jr. (1990-2000)
Cleveland BRAR: 59
Cleveland FRAR: 173
Cleveland WARP3: 36.6
How Acquired: CLE-SD trade

After winning the AL Rookie of the Year award in 1990, Sandy suffered through one injury after another. Alomar came in the watershed Joe Carter trade in 1989, with Carlos Baerga coming to Cleveland with Sandy. In 1990, he delivered on his huge promise by winning the AL Rookie of the Year and a Gold Glove. Unfortunately, he couldn’t stay healthy throughout his career in Cleveland with rare exceptions. In 1997, he had his best season, and we saw a glimpse of what he was capable of. He hit in 30 straight games, one short of a franchise record. He was the MVP when the All-Star game was played in Cleveland. He also hit a memorable home run off Mariano Rivera in the ALDS. But that season was mostly the exception, not the rule. His height (6’5″) may have been a factor as to why he broke down so much, but regardless, he was an excellent defensive catcher, a very good game-caller, and a midle-of-the-order offensive player. It’s just too bad that his potential could never be truly realized.

(2) Steve O’Neill (1911-1923)
Cleveland BRAR: 130
Cleveland FRAR: 326
Cleveland WARP3: 43.9
How Acquired: Purchased from Philadelphia (AL)

Although O’Neill bested Hegan in both BRAR and FRAR, he lost out because of some bad offensive years early in his career. O’Neill, later in his tenure with the Indians, was one of the best offensive catchers in the game; he finished 6th in the 1922 MVP vote, and in 1920, hit .321/.408/.440 and was one of the key cogs of the World Series champs. As a manager, he led the Detroit Tigers to a championship in 1945, and as the Indians’ manager from 1935-37 was instrumental in the careers of Lou Boudreau and Bob Feller.

(1) Jim Hegan (1941-1957)
Cleveland BRAR: 37
Cleveland FRAR: 313
Cleveland WARP3: 48.5
How Acquired: Signed as a free agent

Hegan’s defense was so good it almost single-handedly made him the best catcher in Indians history. His defensive reputation earned him four All-Star appearances, and he was a large part of the team’s run of success in the 1940s and 1950s, including the 1948 and 1954 AL pennants. Bob Feller let Hegan call his pitches, which was a fairly new concept at the time, and Hegan also caught three no-hitters (Feller, Bob Lemon, and Don Black). He was also known for controlling basestealers and his remarkable durability; he caught well into his late 30s, which even today isn’t common. For all his offensive shortcomings, his durability and defense is good enough to make him the franchise’s best catcher.

About a year ago at this time, I decided to rank the 100 players listed on the The Top 100 Greatest Indians Roster. But after listing the bottom 10, I started to question my methodology. I had originally used OPS+ and ERA+ for the hitters and pitchers, respectively. Unfortunately, this left off defensive accomplishments, leaving defensive specialists like Jim Hegan and Omar Vizquel underrated. And so I stopped the list because I felt the ranking system was flawed.

Now I’m starting to rank the players again, and this time I’ve come across a ranking system that appears to be fair to all types of players. During my research, I’ve seen two measures that allows someone to compare both hitters and pitchers from different periods: Bill James’ Win Shares, and Baseball Prospectus’ WARP3. The former most of you have heard of, and it’s slowly becoming a mainstream statistic. The latter you probably don’t know about, so here’s a brief introduction. WARP is short for “Wins Above Replacement Player.” Essentially, it measures the marginal wins a player is responsible for over a replacement player (one that is easily obtainable). What sets WARP apart over other statistics is that it combines defense, hitting, and pitching, so that you can compare a hitter with a pitcher.

So why WARP3? Well, WARP1 only adjusts within a season, which is fine when comparing MVP or Cy Young candidates, but not too useful when comparing players from different eras. WARP2 adds league difficulty into the statistic, and WARP3 accounts for differences in season length. Because WARP is not a “rate” statistic, adjusting for the length of season is necessary to accurately compare players from the 154-game schedule and the 162-game schedule. As I said before, WARP takes into account both defense, pitching, and offense. That combined with its adjustments to league difficulty and season length makes it one of the better ranking systems for what I’m trying to do.

To further subdivide, I’m also going to rank position players by BRAR (Batting Runs Above Replacement) and FRAR (Fielding Runs Above Replacement), so you can see who was the better hitter or fielder at their position, as well as who was the better player overall.

Another question that popped up in my mind is whether there are players who belong on this list that weren’t selected. As much as we all remember Joe Charboneau, I can think of better players than him. And obviously since the list was released in 2001, there have been a couple players that may be eventually wind up replacing some players on the list. After I rank the players listed, I’ll start to look for players who deserve to be included. Obviously I can’t rank every player who’s played for the franchise, so your help would be appreciated in nominating overlooked players.

The methodolgy is pretty simple for this attempt; I’ll add up the WARP3 each player accumulated while playing for the Indians, along with their BRAR, FRAR, and PRAR (Pitching Runs Above Replacement) totals. I should post the results for the catchers tomorrow.

Oh yeah…all is quiet on the Millwood front, but I’ll be sure to cover it when anything happens.

For the past couple days, I’ve been getting e-mails wondering what I’ve heard about the Indians and Kevin Millwood. I know about as much as you guys; I don’t have any super-secret sources that send me rumors. Anyways, these rumors involving Millwood are gaining steam, as most of the local beat writers (via the AP) have been repeating them. It looks like Millwood, if he passes a physical, is going to get around $7M over a year. Given the market, that’s not too bad at all. I generally have no problem whatsoever in handing out one-year deals no matter how big the payout; in cases like this, the player is taking the most risk. Millwood, who could have signed a multi-year deal last offseason, took the Phillies to arbitration instead. This year, the Phillies weren’t going to get fooled again and didn’t even offer arbitration, so the Indians don’t cough up a draft pick.

Contrary to what some of the local media personalities think, adding payroll is not the gold standard for team improvement, for once the team gets on the field, their talent is all that matters. That being said, If the Indians do sign Millwood, the rotation gets better. A lot better, considering the internal alternatives. Millwood’s 3-year VORP average comes to 49.6+37.4+9.3/3 = 32.1. Jason Davis’ 2-year VORP average:11.0+(-1.8)/2= 4.6. That’s quite an upgrade. For some context, CC Sabathia’s 3-year VORP average is 39.9, and Jake Westbrook posted a VORP of 54.4 last season. Granted, the reason Millwood hasn’t got as much interest as, say, Matt Clement is because he was ineffective last season and because he suffered two seperate injuries, one of which involved his throwing elbow. But with a one-year deal, it’s a low-risk/high-reward type of acquisition.

So if this deal happens, and the monetary aspects are as speculated, it’s a nice signing for the Indians, given the free agent environment and the team needs.

The magi, as you know, were wise men–wonderfully wise men–who brought gifts to the Babe in the manger. They invented the art of giving Christmas presents. Being wise, their gifts were no doubt wise ones, possibly bearing the privilege of exchange in case of duplication. And here I have lamely related to you the uneventful chronicle of two foolish children in a flat who most unwisely sacrificed for each other the greatest treasures of their house. But in a last word to the wise of these days let it be said that of all who give gifts these two were the wisest. O all who give and receive gifts, such as they are wisest. Everywhere they are wisest. They are the magi.

O. Henry, The Gift of the Magi

To the readers of my daily tripe, I wish you and your families a Merry Christmas.

Signed LHP Billy Traber and RHP Jason Bere to minor-league contracts; Invited them to Spring Training

Re-signed General Manager Mark Shapiro to a two-year extension through 2007

Hear that sound? That silence you hear is the various talking heads in the local media finding another hot-button issue to pursue. For the last, oh, two months, local TV and newspaper media has been hammering the fact that Shapiro’s contract ended after the 2005 season, and that he was headed to Washington. Thankfully now this issue can be put to rest. I guess Roger Brown can start running columns on how fat Ronnie Belliard is getting while playing winter ball.

Jason Bere is a running joke now. I mean, if you’ve been following this team for the past three years, how could you not burst out laughing after hearing that the Indians were bring Bere back for his latest comeback attempt? I commend Jason for his determination to stick it out, but enough is enough. I probably said exactly the same thing last year at this time, so maybe in 2006, I’ll just do a copy-paste when Bere inks another minor-league deal.

There has to be more to Traber’s injury than meets the eye. The Indians were very cryptic when talking about Traber even after they lost him on waivers. This leads me to believe that his elbow isn’t getting any better, something Boston probably determined after they claimed him last month. Given that Traber was nowhere near arbitration-eligible and the Red Sox had plenty of roster spots to burn, I’m guessing that Traber is nearing lost-cause status. Hopefully I’m wrong with this assumption, but that’s what it looks like from a distance.

Josh Phelps has apparently signed with Tampa Bay, pending a physical. Tampa is a good choice for Josh; he may be their full-time DH, even against right-handers, and may resurrect his career there.

Who’d have thunk it?

The Indians have signed GM Mark Shapiro to a two-year extension through 2007. Well-deserved.